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CENTRALIZED REVIEW OF TAX REGULATIONS 
Clinton G. Wallace* 
Centralized oversight of agency policymaking and spending by the President’s Of-
fice of Management and Budget is a hallmark of the modern administrative state. 
But tax regulations have almost never been subject to centralized review. The 
Trump Administration recently proposed requiring centralized review of tax regula-
tions, but it is unclear what regulations would be subject to such review or how it 
would be conducted. 
This Article examines the normative desirability of the longstanding approach of ex-
empting tax regulations from centralized review, and the alternative of imposing 
such review. Scholars and policymakers have provided various incomplete justifica-
tions for excepting tax policy from centralized review, including concerns about po-
liticizing tax administration, analytical challenges, and ossification. I conclude that 
none of the reasons offered in the past for a default rule of no review are sufficient 
in light of the potential normative benefits of centralized review. The analysis here 
brings to the fore multiple functions of tax regulations, including shaping private 
behavior, raising revenue, and implementing precise congressional directives. I 
make the case that, for some tax regulations, centralized review can facilitate pro-
ductive coordination with other parts of government, increase political accountabil-
ity, and introduce analytical rigor through quantified analysis. This Article outlines 
the limitations of current centralized review conventions and proposes some specific 
adjustments. These adjustments include setting a threshold for review based on rev-
enue estimates and producing both revenue estimates and distributional analysis as 
part of the regulation-drafting process. 
The major tax legislation Congress enacted at the end of 2017 included numerous 
broad delegations. Thus, forthcoming tax regulations will reshape the tax system 
significantly, and the Trump Administration is poised to begin some version of cen-
tralized review of tax regulations, although many important issues remain unre-
solved. Recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of centralized review as applied 
to tax policy will help to establish consistent and productive oversight of the tax 
regulatory process. 
 
*  Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. Thanks to Ari Glogower, 
Lisa Heinzerling, Sally Katzen, Ricky Revesz, Scott Skinner-Thompson, participants in the New Ad-
ministrative Law Scholarship Roundtable, and numerous colleagues at the University of South Carolina 
for reviewing and discussing drafts, as well as to Lily Batchelder, Josh Blank, David Kamin, and the 
New York University School of Law Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium for engaging in helpful dis-
cussions and providing feedback at early stages of this project. For excellent research assistance, thank 
you to Jeff Blaylock, Kevin Raus, Keith Taylor, and Christina Westervelt. All errors are my own. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress enacted major tax legislation late in 2017,1 reworking 
significant portions of the tax code, they did something unusual for tax leg-
islation: they acted quickly. Whereas the legislative process that culminated 
in the major tax reform of 1986 played out over almost two years, the 2017 
legislation was written and enacted in just four months.2 Congress’s haste 
has placed special pressure on the Department of the Treasury and the In-
ternal Revenue Service (the IRS or the Service) to implement the new tax 
provisions. Often, in the past, when Congress has worked more ponderous-
ly, they have enacted highly detailed tax legislation that has delegated very 
little policymaking authority to the Executive Branch. But the 2017 Tax 
Act is different: Congress is relying on Treasury and the Service to develop 
regulations and guidance without which the new law simply will not 
work—and Treasury and the Service must deal with myriad issues that 
Congress did not have time to confront themselves and thus delegated in 
broad strokes.3 The pressure is on for the Executive Branch, as many of the 
new provisions are effective immediately for tax year 2018. 
Often when Congress delegates broad authority to an agency, they do 
so knowing that the President will have a substantial role in overseeing 
subsequent agency actions.4 A key mechanism for this oversight is the 
“centralized review” process overseen by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB).5 This centralized review often includes an interagency pro-
cess whereby subject-matter experts from other departments and agencies 
 
1.  The legislation, referred to throughout as the “2017 Tax Act,” was enacted in December 2017 
and is often referred to as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, although its official name—because of partisan 
wrangling in the U.S. Senate—is the “Act [t]o provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of 
the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
131 Stat. 2054. 
2.  The main part of the legislative process leading to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 took twenty-
one months, beginning in early 1985 and extending through most of the year, as legislating Committees 
and Subcommittees in each house held hearings and markups. A Conference Committee spent a month 
reconciling the bills from each house, and staff from each house and the Joint Committee on Taxation 
worked for another month after that to draft the Conference Committee Report and the final legislation 
that Congress enacted. See generally JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT 
GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1988) (de-
tailing the legislative process from start to finish). 
3.  One example is the pass-through deduction, 26 U.S.C. § 199A (West Supp. 2018), discussed 
infra notes 189–92 and accompanying text. See also infra note 128 (providing other examples). 
4.  See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–32 (2001). 
5.  See Memorandum from OMB Director Leon E. Panetta for Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies, And Independent Regulatory Agencies, Guidance for Implementing E.O. 12866 (Oct. 12, 
1993), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/inforeg/eo12866_implementa 
tion_guidance.pdf (referring to OMB’s oversight of regulatory actions as “centralized review”); Nicho-
las Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1260, 1260–61 (2006). 
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are given a chance to review a proposed regulatory action, and OMB often 
requires the rulemaking agency to prepare cost–benefit analysis, whereby 
the agency undertakes a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the effects 
of a proposed rule, following OIRA guidelines on how this analysis should 
proceed.6 
But this OMB oversight has, dating back to the Reagan Administration, 
left out an essential piece of the federal government’s regulatory and fiscal 
policy apparatus: the tax system. Indeed, there has been practically no cen-
tralized review of tax policy in the past. Since 2011, just one tax regulation 
has been subject to plenary centralized review.7 This lack of review came 
even as Treasury has produced hundreds of regulations, including many 
that appear to meet the usual requirements for centralized review, as “sig-
nificant” or “economically significant,” meaning that they raise “novel” 
policy issues or will have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million 
or more.8 Meanwhile, thousands of regulations produced by other depart-
ments and agencies were subject to centralized review.9 Treasury has 
avoided such review by regularly asserting that its tax regulations are ex-
empt.10 OMB has accepted this assertion,11 and has generally been content 
to view tax regulations as addressing “transfer payments,” a category of 
 
6.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003) [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4]; OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY 
AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER (2011) [hereinafter OIRA PRIMER]. 
7.  The regulation sought to limit the U.S. tax benefits of corporate inversion transactions. T.D. 
9790, 2016-45 I.R.B. 540; see infra Section II.B.2. The Obama Administration proposed the Regulation 
only after years of urging Congress to enact legislation to accomplish the same thing; as explained 
infra, the Obama Administration was exceedingly cautious in pushing this Regulation, but nonetheless, 
the White House’s involvement in the tax regulatory process broke with various decades-old norms 
against direct White House involvement in Treasury’s tax regulations. Another set of tax-related rules 
was subject to centralized review during the Obama Administration, but that Regulation did not address 
any substantive tax law and was promulgated under statutory authority outside of the tax code. See infra 
note 104 and accompanying text. 
8.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. §§ 638, 641 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2012); see infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
9.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-720, REGULATORY GUIDANCE PROCESSES: 
TREASURY AND OMB NEED TO REEVALUATE LONG-STANDING EXEMPTIONS OF TAX REGULATIONS 
AND GUIDANCE 18 (2016) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. From 2011 to 2013, more than 350 regulations 
proposed across the Executive Branch were determined to be “economically significant” and were 
subject to centralized review as such; of those 350, just one was a tax-related regulation, and that one 
did not arise from the tax code. Id. OMB reviews in excess of 400 proposed and final regulations each 
year from other (non-tax) departments and agencies. 
10.  E.g., infra note 22 (example of the exemption claim).  
11.  Under a long-standing agreement dating back to 1983, OMB generally does not review tax 
regulations, although this exemption did not include economically significant regulations. Memoran-
dum of Agreement, Treasury and OMB Implementation of Executive Order 12291 (Apr. 29, 1983) 
[hereinafter 1983 Treasury–OMB Memorandum]. See supra note 9; infra notes 45, 97, 104 and accom-
panying text. 
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government action that OMB’s oversight framework exempts from cost–
benefit analysis.12  
But now, centralized review of tax regulations is fast becoming a reali-
ty. The issue gained attention in political circles around 2016 when the 
Obama Administration subjected a tax regulation to centralized review.13 In 
2017, the Trump Administration began to formally reconsider the tax regu-
lation exemption.14 In early 2018, OMB and Treasury agreed to dispense 
with the exemption and gave themselves one year to set parameters for on-
going centralized review of certain tax regulations.15 
This Article examines the normative desirability of the longstanding 
approach of exempting tax regulations from centralized review and the al-
ternative of imposing such review. First, I chart as a descriptive matter how 
tax regulations are produced outside of the well-developed system of cen-
tralized review and challenge several justifications for this omission that 
have been offered by scholars and policymakers. I argue that none of the 
proffered reasons for distinct treatment of tax regulations is sufficient to 
justify categorically foregoing centralized review of tax regulations in light 
of the normative justifications for centralized review. 
Rather, I make the case that centralized review can have salutary ef-
fects on some tax regulations, but realizing any benefits depends on the 
substance of each particular tax regulation.16 First, more specifically, cen-
tralized review is appropriate and would be beneficial (with some modifi-
cations) in the development of tax regulations that have incentive effects 
that, in turn, affect private behavior—what I call the private-allocation 
function of tax regulations. On the other hand, I argue that centralized re-
view can be used to elicit and make public useful information that Treasury 
is already capable of producing on tax regulations that primarily raise reve-
nue—what I call the public-allocation function of tax regulations. That is, 
OMB should require Treasury to produce revenue estimates and distribu-
tional analysis when the public-allocation function features prominently. I 
argue that centralized review does not offer benefits for tax regulations that 
simply implement clear congressional directives—what I call the imple-
 
12.  See infra notes 52, 196–99 and accompanying text.   
13.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
14.  See Exec. Order No. 13,789, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317 (Apr. 21, 2017) (directing Treasury and 
OMB to reconsider the exemption for tax regulations); GAO REPORT, supra note 9; supra notes 6–13 
and accompany text; infra notes 15–33, 115–16, 120–22 and accompanying text; infra Section II.B.3. 
15.  See Memorandum of Agreement from the Dep’t of the Treasury and the Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget on Review of Tax Regulations under Exec. Order 12866 (Apr. 11, 2018), https://home.treasury 
.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf; Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury, OMB Update Tax Regulatory Review Process (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0345. 
16.  See infra Part IV. 
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menting function. Thus, the standard practice of abstaining from centralized 
review is, indeed, justified on normative grounds for a broad swath of tax 
regulations that are highly prescribed by Congress.17 Finally, I question the 
Trump Administration’s proposal to use the same trigger for OMB review 
of tax regulations as it does for other types of regulations and to disregard 
transfer payments in determining whether a tax regulation warrants review. 
Congress’s broad delegations in the 2017 Tax Act mean more opportu-
nities for Executive Branch tax policymaking—and the questions of who 
will determine that policy and how are important. In popular debates, cen-
tralized review is associated with presidential control, which has spurred 
some critical reactions in the current political environment. But absent cen-
tralized review, there are very few formal protections to insulate tax-
regulation writing from political influence. I argue that systematic, as op-
posed to ad hoc, centralized review can be beneficial, especially when there 
are acute concerns about politicizing tax administration, because central-
ized review fosters transparency and analytical rigor. 
The typical presidential tax-policy blind spot has led to the Executive 
Branch treating similar sorts of policy decisions in bizarrely different ways. 
This variation is particularly striking in the case of the private-allocation 
function. Consider one example18: regulatory policy addressing health care 
is largely devised and implemented by the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (HHS). Thus, when HHS recently conceived of a regulation 
to promote tobacco-cessation incentives in health insurance policies, that 
regulation was subject to direct review by OMB, including an OMB-run 
interagency coordination process.19 OMB required that HHS assess the 
costs and benefits of the proposal, and of alternative proposals, to maxim-
 
17.  See Clinton G. Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, 71 TAX L. REV. 179, 182 
(2017).  That article examines the institutions and practices in Congress that give rise to what I identify 
in this Article as the implementing function, making the case that Congress is uniquely able to enact 
detailed and precise tax statutes that leave little if any policymaking discretion to Treasury. Id. This 
process includes making use of the expertise of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and pro-
ducing voluminous “[s]pecific and illuminating legislative history.” Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 
278, 284 (1960). As such, in some instances, the substantive content of regulations is determined by 
Congress, leaving little policymaking discretion to the agency—i.e., the “merits of the regulation” may 
be “strongly determined by a statute.” See John C. Coates IV, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis: An 
Essay on Regulatory Management, 78(3) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2015). This Article focuses on 
centralized review of regulations that result from broader delegations, leading to regulations that carry 
out the private-allocation and public-allocation functions. 
18.  See infra notes 202–10 and accompanying text (describing this example in further detail). 
19.  Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans: Final Rule, 78 
Fed. Reg. 33,158 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2950, 45 C.F.R. pts. 
146 & 147). Technically, this is a joint regulation issued under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 by HHS, DOL, and Treasury together. Id. Treasury claimed that its regula-
tion (which duplicates the HHS and DOL regulations) was exempt from the requirements of Executive 
Order 12,866, but this exemption did not extend to HHS and DOL. So, the regulation went through 
those departments’ standard review processes and was subject to centralized review. 
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ize net benefits, introducing rigorous analytical requirements to HHS’s de-
cision-making process.20 
But HHS is not the only department that deals with smoking-cessation 
programs—surprisingly enough, Treasury’s tax regulations have also ad-
dressed smoking-cessation incentives in employer health insurance poli-
cies.21 In contrast to the HHS rule, when Treasury devised a tax regulation 
that dealt with tobacco cessation, that rule was not subject to OMB review 
of any sort. Rather, Treasury stated in the preamble to its proposed and fi-
nal regulations that centralized review was not required, and no such re-
view was carried out.22 As a result, regulation-writers at Treasury were not 
subject to OMB oversight, and the proposed rule was not subject to any 
interagency review process, even though Treasury personnel were address-
ing an issue that appeared to be far outside of the realm of Treasury exper-
tise. Further, with no cost–benefit analysis, the proposal was treated like 
other transfer payments that receive reduced OMB scrutiny as compared to 
other regulatory proposals23—even though the stated purpose of the provi-
sion is to disincentivize smoking, which is precisely the sort of behavior-
changing policy that standard cost–benefit analysis can illuminate. None-
theless, the final regulation was not a product of any cost–benefit analysis 
or explicit consideration of policy alternatives that OMB generally re-
quires. In the end, the final Treasury Regulation was subject to less analyti-
cal rigor than the HHS Regulation, but not for any stated or apparently 
deliberate reason. 
The varied treatment—centralized review or not—has oddly hinged on 
whether Congress has delegated authority to Treasury and the Service or to 
another department or agency. And these regulations on smoking-cessation 
incentives—and the distinct, and in some instances counterintuitive, treat-
ment of tax regulations as compared to other regulations with similar policy 
objectives—are not an anomaly. Treasury produces reams of tax regula-
tions and guidance documents prescribing how the tax system operates and 
how it carries out and affects a wide variety of social and economic poli-
cies. These regulations establish policies related to raising revenue to fund 
 
20.  Id. at 33,168, tbl.1 (summarizing analysis of quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits). 
21.  Minimum Essential Coverage and Other Rules Regarding Shared Responsibility Payment for 
Individuals, 79 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4306 (proposed Jan. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); see 
infra notes 202–10 and accompanying text. 
22.  The proposed regulation states: “It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemak-
ing is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866, as supplemented by 
Executive Order 13563. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined 
that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to the pro-
posed regulations.” Shared Responsibility Payment for Not Maintaining Minimum Essential Coverage, 
78 Fed. Reg. 7314, 7322 (proposed Feb. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
23.  See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 6, at 38. 
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federal government operations, healthcare, education, labor, the environ-
ment, and other important policy areas, often shaping private behavior. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview of the 
mechanics and purposes of centralized review, including the roles of cost–
benefit analysis and interagency review, and how that analysis and review 
is typically carried out. It also describes the process Treasury has used until 
recently to produce tax regulations, and reviews recent moves towards cen-
tralized review, initially by the Obama Administration and more formally 
by the Trump Administration. Part III analyzes the potential advantages, 
disadvantages, and challenges of centralized review of tax regulations: Po-
litical accountability must be balanced against the potential harms of politi-
cization; quantified analysis is potentially illuminating but presents myriad 
practical obstacles; and the interagency review process can yield more 
thoughtful policy, but at the risk of ossification. Part IV seeks a way for-
ward, proposing that different functions of tax regulations receive different 
treatment for centralized review purposes. This Part also responds to the 
Trump Administration framework. Part V concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Centralized Review Outside of Tax 
This Part provides an overview of the centralized review process and 
sets out the normative underpinnings of centralized review. Centralized 
review is generally—outside of the tax context—carried out in one of two 
ways. For regulatory activity, OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) supervises Executive Branch-agency24 policy development. 
Agencies are required to disclose to OIRA any planned regulatory and 
guidance actions; OIRA then helps ensure that those actions are consistent 
with presidential priorities and are carefully considered—including shep-
herding the proposal through an interagency review process and quantify-
ing costs and benefits.25 For fiscal policy, personnel within OMB closely 
monitor each agency’s ongoing spending and shape budget priorities for 
future spending within agencies as well as appropriations requests made to 
 
24.  Executive Branch agencies are distinguished from independent regulatory agencies, which 
produce regulations that are not necessarily subject to centralized review. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bress-
man & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600–01 
(2010). 
25.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6, 3 C.F.R. §§ 638, 644–48 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 (2012) (describing “centralized review” of agency regulations). 
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Congress.26 In other words, Congress receives spending requests only once 
they have been filtered through OMB, and the use of agency funds that 
have been appropriated by Congress but without precise earmarking is sub-
ject to review—and can be influenced—by OMB. Thus, OMB’s role in 
overseeing and managing both regulatory policy and fiscal policy on behalf 
of the President is expansive. 
The focus here is on the regulatory side (as opposed to spending).27 
OIRA is charged with overseeing all “regulatory actions” taken by any Ex-
ecutive Branch department or agency (but not independent agencies), and 
thus, OIRA can review all variety of agency guidance, including regula-
tions that are finalized through the notice-and-comment process and sub-
regulatory material, such as policy statements, that are not subject to notice 
and comment.28 
Many scholars and policymakers view centralized review of proposed 
regulations—at least, nontax regulations—as an essential element of the 
federal rulemaking process for Executive Branch agencies.29 This central-
ized review often relies on cost–benefit analysis carried out by the rulemak-
ing agency, following OIRA guidelines on how this analysis should 
proceed.30 OIRA also subjects draft regulations to an interagency review 
process whereby experts in parts of the government who did not draft the 
regulation can weigh in on the substance and analysis of a regulation.31 
Over the past thirty-plus years, centralized review has been embraced by 
Republican and Democratic Administrations alike, and cost–benefit analy-
sis has proliferated in the development of a wide range of regulatory poli-
cies, including environmental regulation, public health regulation, and 
financial regulation, among other areas. 
There are many potential benefits of centralized review. The process is 
thought to foster political accountability for agency action by way of the 
 
26.  See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101–26 (2012); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET § 10 
(2016); Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 
2182, 2186–88 (2016). 
27.  While the tax system is certainly central to fiscal policy, this Article is limited to considering 
how tax regulations might fit into the existing OMB architecture for oversight of regulatory policy. Like 
other departments and agencies, Treasury and the IRS carry out congressional mandates through regula-
tions, so distinct treatment of tax regulations by OMB deserves scrutiny. Further consideration of 
OMB’s tools for oversight of spending is necessary to determine whether such tools are relevant to 
other aspects of the tax system and tax administration. 
28.  See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
29.  Again, Executive Branch agencies are distinguished from independent agencies, which gen-
erally are not subject to OIRA oversight. See supra note 24; infra note 167 (describing the IRS’s place 
in the Executive Branch as featuring some hallmarks of agency independence). 
30.  See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 6. 
31.  See FAQ, Regulations and the Rulemaking Process, REGINFO.GOV, https://www.reginfo 
.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
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President;32 it can stave off overregulation;33 and it can help prevent inter-
est-group capture.34 Scholars also credit centralized review as a mechanism 
for interagency coordination, which results in more effective and consistent 
regulatory policies.35 Recently, scholars have recognized that OMB’s role 
in the budget process provides similar benefits in terms of aligning spend-
ing with presidential priorities.36 Likewise, many scholars laud cost–benefit 
analysis as an indispensable tool for comparing alternative regulatory op-
tions.37 This consideration allows policymakers to maximize the extent to 
which the benefits of each regulation exceed total costs (direct and indirect, 
private and social) with the goal of improving social welfare.38 Early skep-
 
32.  Joseph Cooper & William F. West, Presidential Power and Republican Government: The 
Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules, 50 J. POL. 864, 882–83 (1988); Christopher C. 
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 
1081 (1986); Kagan, supra note 4, at 2331–32; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the 
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1995). 
33.  Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 1262; See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. 
LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 175–79 (2008). 
34.  See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the 
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167, 178 (1990); Michael A. 
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 
1337, 1340–41 (2013); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking Sys-
tem, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1150 (1990) (noting that capture is less likely when an entity reviews a 
wide range of issues); Susan Webb Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policy-
making, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 
320, 323 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) [hereinafter PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE]. 
35.  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 31 (2010); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 369, 374–75 (2016); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination 
in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1184, 1209–10 (2012) (“Coordination tools can 
help agencies to manage overlapping agency functions or related jurisdictional assignments in ways that 
improve both cumulative expertise and the quality of the final agency decision.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1838, 1847–48 (2013). 
36.  See Pasachoff, supra note 26, at 2188; Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, 
Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1720–21 (2017). 
37.  E.g., Coats, supra note 17, at 5 (stating that cost–benefit analysis is “the best available over-
arching conceptual framework for organizing and communicating the pros and cons of a proposed regu-
lation”); accord Ryan Bubb, Comment, The OIRA Model for Institutionalizing CBA of Financial 
Regulation, 78(3) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47–48 (2015) (responding to Coates’s declaration with 
“[a]men to that”). 
38.  E.g., Jean Drèze & Nicholas Stern, The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
PUB. ECON. 909 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987). Widespread use of cost–benefit 
analysis of proposed regulations across a broad range of policies (i.e., across many different proposed 
regulations) helps to ensure that the “estimated social benefits of all rules exceed the estimated social 
costs.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Budget Debate, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 249, 
250 (2016); Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1638 (2016) 
(“[T]he whole point of cost-benefit analysis is to provide information about the effects on social wel-
fare . . . .”). The Trump Administration has attempted to reframe the popular debate and use the term 
“regulatory budget” to focus solely on the estimated costs of regulations and disregard anticipated bene-
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ticism from public-interest-oriented scholars about reliance on centralized 
review and cost–benefit analysis—in particular, because costs were per-
ceived to be more readily quantifiable than benefits, potentially creating a 
bias against regulation—has largely given way to debates about how to 
conduct centralized review and cost–benefit analysis,39 not whether to do 
so.40 
Centralized review, including in some cases cost–benefit analysis, is 
overseen by OIRA.41 OIRA has a broad mandate to oversee the develop-
ment of rules, interpretations of law, policy determinations, and other guid-
ance produced by Executive Branch departments and agencies. For each 
regulatory proposal, each agency is required to identify for OIRA “the 
problem that it intends to address” and to “assess the significance of that 
problem.”42 The agency is instructed to “tailor its regulations to impose the 
least burden on society . . . consistent with obtaining the regulatory objec-
tives.”43 OIRA, in turn, reviews each proposal (to varying degrees), and in 
some instances, oversees an interagency review and coordination process.44 
The wellspring of OIRA’s authority is Executive Order 12,866.45 It 
calls for centralized review of any “regulatory action,” defined as any “sub-
 
fits. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2016 DRAFT 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 5–33 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 OIRA 
Draft Report] (showing the overall increases in estimated benefits and costs over a ten-year period); 
Glenn Kessler, Fact Checker: The White House Claim that Obama-era Regulations Have Cost $890 
Billion, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/02/ 
21/the-white-house-claim-that-obama-era-regulations-have-cost-890-billion/?utm_term=.6772bfbf2141. 
See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS (2006) (describing the “traditional” view of cost–benefit analysis, and describing theoretical 
challenges with measuring changes in welfare); John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative 
Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2008). 
39.  This is a heated debated in itself, and has made “centralized review” something of a moving 
target—its reach and form are continually shifting. See Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1847–48. 
40.  But see Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Re-
view, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 214–15 (2012). See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA 
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 
(2004); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991). 
41.  The paragraphs that follow summarize the centralized review process carried out by OIRA. 
For a more-detailed description that includes helpful commentary on the sorts of issues and considera-
tions that OIRA regularly confronts during the process, and OIRA’s internal procedures and practices 
during the course of the review, see Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1844–63. 
42.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. § 639 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2012). 
43.  Id. (directing OIRA to provide “meaningful guidance and oversight so that each agency’s 
regulatory actions are consistent with applicable law, [and] the President’s priorities”). 
44.  Id. 
45.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1, 3 C.F.R. §§ 638–40; Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 
(2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012). This followed and updated Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 
C.F.R. § 638, and Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012). 
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stantive action” related to the eventual promulgation of a final rule, wheth-
er or not the action is published in the Federal Register, by Executive 
Branch departments, agencies, and other parts of the federal government.46 
In practice, this allows OIRA to oversee all variety of agency guidance, 
including sub-regulatory material, such as policy statements, that are not 
subject to notice and comment.47 Centralized review under Executive Order 
12,866 does not apply to certain specified independent agencies and “agen-
cies specifically exempted by the Administrator of OIRA.”48 
In accordance with the Executive Order, agencies must regularly dis-
close to OIRA any planned regulatory actions and must designate any ac-
tions that it believes to be significant or economically significant.49 A 
significant regulatory action includes any action that might be in conflict 
with an action taken by another agency, any action that might “[m]aterially 
alter the budgetary impact of entitlements” or certain other government 
fiscal programs, or that might “[r]aise [a] novel legal or policy issue.”50 An 
economically significant regulatory action is an action that would have “an 
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more,” as well as any oth-
er regulation that is expected to “adversely affect in a material way” some 
aspect of “the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competi-
tion, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal 
governments or communities.”51 The $100 million threshold includes 
 
46.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. § 640. 
47.  Centralized review could also apply to sub-regulatory guidance. In a 2007 bulletin, OMB 
established a threshold for centralized review of guidance documents similar to the economically signif-
icant designation used for regulations, but OMB and subsequent Treasury guidance exempted the IRS 
from the requirements in the Bulletin. Treas. Dir. 28-04 (July 10, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/about 
/role-of-treasury-orders-directives/Pages/td28-04.aspx; GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 28. Nonetheless, 
it is clear that some sub-regulatory tax guidance documents fall within the standards provided in the 
OMB Bulletin, and so excluding these documents from centralized review raises issues similar to the 
exclusion of regulations that is the central focus here. For example, in 2016, the IRS issued a new “no-
ruling” policy indicating that it would no longer offer advanced approval of certain spin-off transac-
tions. Rev. Proc. 2016-1, 2016-1 I.R.B. 1 (addressing the “active trade or business” requirement under 
section 355). The immediate (and predictable) effect of this guidance was that Yahoo’s planned $10 
billion spinoff of its Alibaba stock holdings was abandoned—this transaction alone would seem to 
exceed the $100 million threshold. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (describing “economically 
significant” regulatory actions, which have an economic effect of $100 million or more, as subject to 
centralized review under the applicable Executive Orders). 
48.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6, 3 C.F.R. §§ 644–48; see supra note 24. 
49.  Id. § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. § 645. 
50.  Id. § 3(f)(4), 3 C.F.R. § 642. 
51.  Id. § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. §§ 641–42. Previously, Executive Order 12,291 established a category of 
“major” rules that invoked the same $100 million threshold, applying to rules with an “annual effect on 
the economy of $100 million or more.” Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. §§ 127–28 (1981). 
Similarly, the Congressional Review Act defines “major” rules, which can be revoked through the 
legislative process, as rules that the OIRA administrator determines has had or will likely have an annu-
al effect on the economy of $100 million or more; will likely result in a “major” increase in prices for 
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amounts of any “transfer” payments.52 If the agency fails to identify a regu-
lation as significant or economically significant, OIRA can make such a 
designation.53 Any draft rule that is not designated as significant is not sub-
ject to OIRA review beyond the agency providing notification to OIRA that 
it has determined a planned action will not be significant. 
For each significant regulatory action, the agency must provide OIRA 
with an advance draft of the proposed action as well as some analysis of the 
proposal.54 The draft must be accompanied by a statement of need explain-
ing why the action is necessary and how and why the action will achieve 
the desired results.55 Additionally, the agency must explain how the pro-
posal fulfills any statutory mandate and how it addresses or is consistent 
with the President’s priorities.56 And the agency must identify “potential 
 
individuals or for particular groups, industries, or regions; or will have “significant adverse effects on 
competition, employment, investment, productivity, [or] innovation.” 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2012). 
52.  This point is not explicit in the Executive Order, but in recent years, OIRA has reported that 
many “economically significant” regulations are categorized as such because they carry out a transfer, 
in most cases a transfer from the government (for example, in the form of a subsidy payment). See, e.g., 
OIRA DRAFT 2016 REPORT 8 n.15, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ 
legislative_reports/draft_2016_cost_benefit_report_12_14_2016_2.pdf; Sunstein, supra note 35, at 
1868–69 (describing OIRA practices for providing oversight of transfer payments in excess of $100 
million, which does not include cost–benefit analysis). This $100 million transfer standard is not cur-
rently applied to trigger OIRA review of tax regulations. See infra Part III. 
53.  OIRA has ten days to review the designation and can make a determination that a proposed 
rule is significant or request more information from the agency; otherwise, the rule is not subject to 
further OIRA review. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. § 645. 
54.  Id. § 6(a)(3)(B)(i), 3 C.F.R. § 645. 
55.  Id. The statement of need explains the problem that the regulation is intended to address and 
lays out the authority for the agency to address it via regulation, as well as detailing the “extent of dis-
cretion” Congress has granted to the agency. OIRA PRIMER, supra note 6, at 2. Executive Order 12,866 
directs that a regulation should only be pursued if it is “required by law, [is] necessary to interpret the 
law, or [is] made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of private markets to 
protect or improve the health and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the Ameri-
can people.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. § 638. The statement can be as simple as a single 
sentence citing a statutory mandate, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, RIN: 0910-AG57, Food Labeling: Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Res-
taurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments (2013), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgenda 
ViewRule?pubId=201310&RIN=0910-AG57 (requiring nutrition labeling in chain restaurants as man-
dated by section 4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), or the statement can provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the role of the proposal in a broader regulatory or statutory scheme and 
how it connects to broader policy initiatives, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RIN: 2060-AS47, Model Trading Rules for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014 (2016), 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201510&RIN=2060-AS47 (providing a 
broad explanation of the EPA’s notice of final rulemaking for model rules in greenhouse-gas-emission 
guidelines, as part of a President Obama’s Climate Action Plan). OIRA suggests some categories of 
reasons for action, including market failures (for example, externalities or asymmetric information in 
the market) and “[o]ther [s]ocial [p]urposes,” such as preventing discrimination, protecting privacy, and 
promoting “other democratic aspirations.” CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 6, at 5. 
56.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii), 3 C.F.R. § 645. 
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costs and benefits” of the action57 and “avoid[] undue interference” with 
nonfederal government bodies.58 
For any economically significant action, the drafting agency must go a 
step further. In addition to the information and analysis required for signifi-
cant actions, as described in the preceding paragraphs, the agency must also 
undertake a “Regulatory Impact Analysis”—i.e., qualitative cost–benefit 
analysis, quantitative cost–benefit analysis, or both—and provide that anal-
ysis to OIRA.59 The agency is directed to select the regulatory approach 
that will “maximize net benefits” and will “impose the least burden on so-
ciety, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives.”60 The purpose of the 
analysis is to “learn if the benefits of an action are likely to justify the 
costs” or to “discover which of various possible alternatives would be the 
most cost-effective.”61 There are several audiences for this analysis: OIRA 
and the executive office of the President, other agencies, and the public—
ideally all should be informed and given an opportunity to react to the 
analysis.62 
The analysis should also include identification and analysis of alterna-
tives to the agency’s preferred regulatory approach.63 For example, the 
agency might consider regulation at the state or local level, as well as vol-
untary action or the alternative of not regulating at all.64 The agency should 
also consider particular design alternatives, such as different default rules, 
different types of communication plans, or other alternative mechanisms 
that might affect the efficacy and impact of the regulation.65 OIRA advises 
that agencies should use this requirement to “specify performance objec-
tives” rather than locking into a specific action or “manner of compliance 
that regulated entities must adopt.”66 That is, agency personnel should think 
creatively about what they are trying to accomplish and how to accomplish 
it. 
OIRA provides direction on the types of costs and benefits that agen-
cies should take into account and on the best methods for quantifying and 
 
57.  Id. This assessment of costs and benefits is not necessarily quantified. For these non-
economically significant regulations, the agency is not required to compare costs and benefits to poten-
tial alternative policy options; thus, this mandate results in only rudimentary consideration of costs and 
benefits. 
58.  Id. 
59.  See OIRA PRIMER, supra note 6, at 2. 
60.  Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012). 
61.  CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 6, at 2. 
62.  See id. 
63.  Id. 
64.  OIRA PRIMER, supra note 6, at 2. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. at 3. 
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monetizing these costs and benefits.67 The basic analysis calls for agencies 
to define a baseline that identifies “what the world would be like absent” 
the proposed regulatory action.68 Agencies are directed to “use the best rea-
sonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information to 
quantify the likely benefits and costs of each regulatory alternative.”69 
OIRA provides direction on the types of costs and benefits agencies should 
take into account—for example, “[p]rivate-sector compliance costs” and 
“[g]ains or losses in consumers’ or producers’ surpluses.”70 Agencies are 
directed to distinguish between those costs and benefits that can be mone-
tized, those that can be quantified but not monetized, and those that cannot 
be quantified and to identify the timing of each category of costs and bene-
fits.71 And OIRA provides guidance on how agencies should quantify and 
monetize the effects of a rule, including relying on empirical studies of in-
dividual “willingness to pay” or “willingness to accept” a regulatory alter-
native and discounting of future benefits and costs.72 
OIRA’s guidance also calls for agencies to “provide a separate descrip-
tion of distributional effects . . . so that decision makers can properly con-
sider them along with the effects on economic efficiency.”73 That is, 
distributional analysis is not to be included as part of the cost–benefit anal-
ysis, but such analysis is encouraged as an addendum to the proposed regu-
lation. OIRA does provide that “[w]here distributive effects are thought to 
be important, the effects of various regulatory alternatives should be de-
scribed quantitatively to the extent possible, including the magnitude, like-
lihood, and severity of impacts on particular groups.”74 And it provides 
examples of some distributional effects that could be quantified—for ex-
ample, “[r]eductions in well-being for some consumers that are matched by 
increases for others.”75 But the directive to include distributional analysis is 
very often disregarded, and scholars and policymakers have lamented the 
scant attention paid to distribution in regulatory analysis.76 
 
67.  Id. (listing nine steps for agencies to undertake in preparing a “[r]egulatory impact analysis”). 
68.  Id. at 4. 
69.  Id. at 9. 
70.  Id. at 10. 
71.  Id. at 7. 
72.  Id. at 9, 11. 
73.  Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. at 8. 
76.  See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 1324–29 (arguing that analysis of distributional con-
sequences should be central to regulatory policymaking). 
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Once the drafting agency submits the requisite information to OIRA, 
OIRA personnel generally have ninety days to conduct a review.77 The re-
view can result in OIRA accepting the regulatory action “as is” or returning 
the action to the drafting agency for “further consideration,” in which case 
OIRA prepares a written explanation of particular issues the agency should 
address in a subsequent draft.78 OIRA engages with the substance of the 
proposal to ensure that it is consistent with “the President’s priorities.”79 
This review includes assessing whether the proposal conflicts with any 
policies or actions undertaken by another agency, which is accomplished 
through an interagency review process that OIRA convenes.80 In that pro-
cess, OIRA personnel seek to “identify and convey interagency views and 
to seek a reasonable consensus.”81 The Obama Administration’s addendum 
to Executive Order 12,866 emphasized the importance of interagency re-
view.82 
Agencies other than the drafting agency may have an interest in the 
regulatory action at issue or may have jurisdiction over some aspect of the 
issue.83 Often, the nature of this interagency review is “highly technical,” 
calling on experts from different departments and agencies to provide in-
formation that informs policy decisions made by other departments and 
agencies.84 A former head of OIRA, Cass Sunstein, explained: 
OIRA may seek, for example, to ensure careful consideration of the views 
of the Department of Justice on a legal issue, or the views of the United 
States Trade Representative on an issue that involves international trade, 
or the views of the Department of Homeland Security and the National 
Security Council on an issue with national security implications, or the 
views of the Department of Energy on the effects of a rule on the energy 
supply. In such cases, career officials with technical expertise are fre-
quently the central actors.85 
Additionally, the interagency review process has put particular emphasis on 
procedural issues: “OIRA also engages lawyers throughout the executive 
branch to help resolve questions of law, including questions of administra-
tive procedure. As noted, OIRA considers itself a guardian of appropriate 
 
77.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(2)(B), 3 C.F.R. § 647 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2012). 
78.  Id. § 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. § 647. 
79.  Id. § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. §§ 646–48. 
80.  Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1841; see generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 35, at 1174–80. 
81.  Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1841. 
82.  See generally Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2011). 
83.  Freeman & Rossi, supra note 35, at 1179. 
84.  Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1842. 
85.  Id. at 1843. 
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procedure, and much of its role is associated with that guardianship (in-
cluding the promotion of public comments).”86 
B. The Process for Drafting Tax Regulations 
This Subpart describes the process for formulating tax regulations, 
starting with the process as it has generally been carried out before 2018 (a 
process which does not involve centralized review). It then describes one 
regulation that was subject to centralized review toward the conclusion of 
the Obama Administration. Finally, it details the Trump Administration’s 
plans to impose some form of centralized review following the enactment 
of the 2017 Tax Act. 
1. Historically: No Centralized Review 
In some ways, the process for drafting tax regulations has been similar 
to the process that OIRA oversees for regulations produced by other de-
partments and agencies, as described in the prior Subpart. The major dis-
tinction is that that there is almost never substantive OIRA review of draft 
tax regulations and, thus, no cost–benefit analysis and no interagency pro-
cess for most tax regulations.87 
The regulation-drafting process is carried out by both IRS and Treasury 
personnel and is overseen by political appointees at both the IRS and 
Treasury—thus, the lines of authority are more blurred than in the more 
typical single-agency-head structure.88 Regulations are produced by the 
IRS Chief Counsel’s office in coordination with Treasury’s Office of Tax 
Policy. Some regulations are drafted solely by attorneys in the Chief Coun-
sel’s office and submitted for review by the attorneys in the Office of Tax 
Policy; for some regulations, the Office of Tax Policy is involved through-
out the drafting process. Once drafted, prior to publication in the Federal 
Register, regulations are subject to review and approval by the IRS Chief 
Counsel, the IRS Commissioner, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Tax Policy, and Treasury’s General Counsel.89 
 
86.  Id. at 1842–43. 
87.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
88. The six Senate-confirmed posts with responsibility for tax administration and policy are the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, the General Counsel 
of the Department of the Treasury, the Inspector General for Tax Administration, the IRS Chief Coun-
sel, and the Commissioner of the IRS (who serves a five-year term). See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & 
MICHAEL GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30959, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS 
REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES HANDLING NOMINATIONS 23–24 (2017). 
89.  In order to be published in the Federal Register, proposed or final regulations must carry the 
signature of both the IRS Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement and the Assistant Secre-
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There is a long-standing understanding among Treasury’s Tax Policy 
personnel and the IRS Chief Counsel’s office that, unlike regulations pro-
duced by other departments and agencies that are subject to centralized re-
view, most tax regulations do not carry the force of law, but this position is 
congruous with the practice of not seeking OMB review.90 Until 2011, 
there was wide agreement among Treasury attorneys, IRS personnel, and 
the tax-practitioner community that “general authority” regulations were 
“interpretive” regulations. This category included all regulations promul-
gated under authority provided in Code section 7805(a), which provides 
general authority for Treasury to “prescribe all needful rules and regula-
tions.”91 On the other hand, only a small handful of regulations are issued 
under “specific” delegations from Congress, and these delegations give 
express direction to issue regulations. These regulations were understood to 
be the only potentially “legislative” regulations.92 Thus, there is a statutory 
justification for this position, but it does not hold up under scrutiny. 
Under nontax precedent, an “interpretive” regulation does not carry the 
force of law and is not subject to the same stringent requirements for defer-
ence as “legislative” regulations, which do carry the force of law. However, 
while the distinction between interpretive and legislative is familiar outside 
of the tax context, the basis for making this distinction among tax regula-
tions is not. Under Mead, whether regulations are interpretive or legislative 
is based on the content of the regulation and the nature of the delegation 
made by Congress.93 But tax jurisprudence never made these sorts of dis-
tinctions until very recently—the Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in Mayo 
Foundation made clear for the first time that the Mead framework applies 
to tax regulations,94 and the Tax Court has subsequently followed this 
lead.95 Nonetheless, the Internal Revenue Manual, which prescribes the tax 
regulation drafting process, still directs that 
 
tary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PINK SIGNATURE PACKAGE IRM 
§ 32.1.6.8 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-006#idm139647525701984. In contrast, 
sub-regulatory guidance is produced by the IRS Chief Counsel’s office and approved by the IRS Chief 
Counsel. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REVIEW AND APPROVAL, IRM § 32.1.1.4.6 (2011), 
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-001#idm139647505234736. 
90.  See generally Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in 
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006). 
91.  26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012). 
92.  See Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, 
Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, TAXES: THE TAX MAGAZINE, Aug. 
2009, at 21, 22–23 (the authors are former Chief Counsels of the Internal Revenue Service). Some 
scholars, however, have long pointed out that this reasoning is problematic. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hick-
man, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative 
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1762–63 (2007). 
93.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001). 
94.  Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57 (2011). 
95.  Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 114–15 (2015). 
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most IRS/Treasury regulations merely implement a statute. The underly-
ing statute provides adequate legal authority to impose or collect a tax, or 
issue a payment to a taxpayer. IRS/Treasury regulations provide a mecha-
nism for the tax to be satisfied or collected, or payment to be issued to the 
taxpayer. The effect from a rule in most IRS/Treasury regulations is al-
most always a result of the underlying statute, rather than the regulation 
itself.96 
A 1983 Memorandum of Agreement between Treasury and OMB sug-
gested that this justification held currency at the dawn of the centralized-
review era.97 The memorandum provided that, under the predecessor to 
Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563,98 the “review procedures of the Ex-
ecutive order are waived with respect to all regulations [issued by the Ser-
vice and Treasury] except legislative regulations that are ‘major’ as defined 
in the Executive order.”99 Treasury and Service officials seem to have 
combined this directive with their understanding that most tax regulations 
are “interpretive” to conclude that essentially no tax regulations are subject 
to centralized review. OMB has rarely questioned Treasury’s determina-
tions.100 
Senator Orrin Hatch, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, 
and a few other members of Congress prompted the Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) to examine the issue.101 GAO recommended that 
Treasury and OMB “reevaluate their long-standing agreement,”102 and it 
highlighted the rarity of centralized review of tax regulations: from 2011 
until midway through 2016, just two of Treasury’s tax-related regulations 
were determined to be significant or economically significant. (One of 
those two is discussed below;103 the other is disregarded in this discussion 
because it is not at all a typical tax regulation—it arose under statutory au-
thority outside of the tax code and had nothing to do with substantive tax 
law.104) Those same regulations were the only ones issued solely by Treas-
 
96.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866, SUPPLEMENTED BY EXECUTIVE 
ORDER 13,563, IRM § 32.1.5.4.7.5.3 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-005#idm1407 
12272190672. 
97.  1983 Treasury–OMB Memorandum, supra note 10. The memorandum of agreement (MOA) 
was made public for the first time in 2016. See Alison Bennett, New Tax Rule Challenges May Follow 
Memorandum Release, BNA: DAILY TAX REPORT (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.bna.com/new-tax-rule-
n57982077591/. 
98.  See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
99.  1983 Treasury–OMB Memorandum, supra note 10, at 1. 
100.  The one recent exception to this is described infra note 104. 
101.  Letter from Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., to Jacob Lew, Sec’y, Dep’t of 
the Treasury (Oct. 11, 2016) (following up after GAO released the 1983 memorandum). 
102.  GAO REPORT, supra note 9. 
103.  See infra Section II.B.2. 
104.  GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 18. Those two regulations were actually two takes at the 
same set of rules, which provided for the nationwide regulation of tax return preparers, covering any 
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ury that were identified as “major” tax regulations for purposes of the Con-
gressional Review Act.105 
Yet, a high-level review shows that dozens of tax regulations from this 
period appear to be significant or economically significant, especially given 
OIRA’s general standard of considering transfers as part of the economic 
effect for purposes of the $100 million threshold. Based on titles and sum-
maries of proposed tax regulations over the last several years, dozens of tax 
regulations appear to meet the $100 million threshold, while just one was 
so designated.106 Frequently, Treasury’s designations of not-significant 
have defied logic: a recent regulation issued under the Affordable Care Act 
was designated as significant (but not economically significant) by the De-
partment of Labor and HHS,107 but when Treasury promulgated the regula-
tion, it stated that 
[n]otwithstanding the determinations of the Department of Labor and De-
partment of Health and Human Services, for purposes of the Department 
of the Treasury, it has been determined that this Treasury decision is not a 
significant regulatory action for purposes of Executive Order 12866. 
Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required.108 
GAO found that from 2013 to 2015 Treasury issued fifteen joint regu-
lations that were not designated as significant or economically significant 
 
person who prepares any tax return or refund request. T.D. 9527, 2011-27 I.R.B. 1, 7. This Regulation 
was not at all a typical Treasury–IRS tax regulation in that it did not arise from the tax code. Id.; see 31 
U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2012). The rules required every preparer to pass a competency exam, register with 
and pay an annual fee to the IRS, and complete continuing education each year. T.D. 9527, 2011-27 
I.R.B. at 7. It was designated as economically significant (initially, in 2011 by OIRA; Treasury did not 
designate it as such) and subject to centralized review. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 18. But the rules 
were ultimately struck down by the D.C. Circuit as exceeding Treasury’s statutory authority. Loving v. 
Internal Revenue Serv., 742 F.3d 1013, 1021–22 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
105.  5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (2012); GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 18–19; see supra note 51. 
106.  For example, in 2016 and 2017 there were fifteen proposed, finalized, or temporary regula-
tions that potentially could have triggered OIRA review as “economically significant,” and just one—
discussed below, see infra Section II.B.2—that was designated as such. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 
20. These regulations addressed topics ranging from the exemption from the ACA’s employer mandate 
for contraceptive coverage for private employers who object to such coverage based on their religious 
beliefs, T.D. 9827, 2017-44 I.R.B. 382, and withholding requirements for gambling winnings from 
bingo and slot machine games, T.D. 9807, 2017-5 I.R.B. 573, to reporting requirements for charitable 
contributions, a measure which was withdrawn but was expected to have a significant effect on claimed 
charitable deductions (though the total revenue effect was undetermined—there was no quantitative 
analysis undertaken in connection with the rule). Substantiation Requirements for Certain Contribu-
tions; Withdrawal, 81 Fed. Reg. 882 (Jan. 8, 2016). 
107.  See Treas. Reg. § 54.9815-2713T (as amended by T.D. 9541, 2011-39 I.R.B. 438); see 
also 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2018) (containing amending language from Treasury Deci-
sion 9541); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2018) (containing language identical to the language amend-
ed by the final tax regulation in Treasury Decision 9541).  
108.  T.D. 9541, 2011-39 I.R.B. 438. 
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by Treasury, but which were so designated by one or both of the other 
drafting agencies.109 
2. A Recent Exception: The Earnings Stripping Rule 
The only recent Treasury Regulation that was designated as economi-
cally significant and subject to OIRA review was a highly politicized 
Obama Administration rule to limit the tax benefits of corporate inver-
sions.110 Inversions are tax-driven transactions that involve a U.S.-
headquartered corporation merging with a foreign corporation, causing the 
foreign corporation to become the parent of the entire corporate structure. 
This inverted structure allows the corporation then to use various mecha-
nisms to prevent some income from being subject to U.S. taxation, reduc-
ing the corporation’s effective tax rates. The 2016 Regulation seeks to stem 
one of the mechanisms used by inverted corporations, reducing the extent 
to which a foreign parent corporation can issue debt to its U.S. subsidi-
ary.111 
President Obama repeatedly urged Congress to act to address the prob-
lem of tax inversions.112 Only after Congress stalled for nearly two years 
did Treasury draft and propose regulations.113 Although the President did 
not issue a directive to Treasury to act, it appeared that the rules were 
prompted by President Obama’s publicly expressed concerns.114 Nonethe-
 
109.  GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 20. 
110.  See supra note 106. See generally Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 633, 635 (2017). 
111.  Before the enactment of the 2017 tax legislation, this sort of debt allowed the U.S. subsidi-
ary to make deductible interest payments that reduced U.S. tax liability and that often flowed into low-
tax jurisdictions, thus reducing U.S. income, reducing the corporation’s tax liability, and reducing reve-
nue collected by corporate income tax. See Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or 
Indebtedness, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,912 (proposed Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified in 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
112.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL 
YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 27–28 (2016) (proposing legislation to limit inversions); DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE 
PROPOSALS 37–38 (2015) (same); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 64–65 (2014) (same); see David Jackson, 
Obama: Congress Should End ‘Tax Inversions,’ USA TODAY (Aug. 6, 2014, 10:13 PM), https://www.u 
satoday.com/story/money/business/2014/08/06/obama-tax-inversions/13697661/. 
113.  Despite failing to act legislatively, members of Congress were engaged in the rulemaking 
process, although the effects of this engagement are unclear. See Naomi Jagoda, Treasury Officials to 
Meet with Lawmakers on Inversion Rules, THE HILL (June 29, 2016, 4:59 PM), http://thehill.com/policy 
/finance /286033-treasury-officials-to-meet-with-lawmakers-on-inversion-rules (describing a meeting 
among presidential appointees and staff from Treasury, staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, and 
members of the House and Senate tax Committees to discuss the proposed rule). 
114.  The President’s statements on Treasury’s actions to combat inversions are conspicuously 
deferential, indicating that President Obama supports Treasury but has not initiated or directed Treas-
ury’s work. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Statement by the 
President (Sep. 22, 2014) (“[M]y Administration will act wherever we can to protect the progress the 
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less, President Obama went to significant lengths to peg the proposed regu-
lation as the independent work of Treasury and the Service, even as that 
seemed far-fetched.115 
Perhaps because the policy seemed to originate from the White House 
and was especially politically salient, the rule was subject to centralized 
review as economically significant. But that review appeared rudimentary. 
Treasury conducted a cost–benefit analysis of the rule, but this analysis 
only compared the anticipated revenue the rule would raise ($843 million 
over 10 years) with the anticipated costs to taxpayers of complying with the 
rules ($13 million over 10 years).116 In accordance with Circular A-4, antic-
ipated revenue was not accounted for as a cost to taxpayers.117 The analysis 
also did not attempt to estimate any potential benefits flowing from gov-
ernment expenditure of the money collected. Despite OIRA’s general in-
struction that distributional considerations should be addressed 
qualitatively, Treasury provided no indication of the incidence of the $843 
million in revenue, nor did Treasury otherwise address, even in broad 
strokes, how it might affect distribution. And, in spite of Circular A-4, the 
analysis involved no contemplation of potential behavioral effects of the 
proposed policy, let alone quantification of those effects. As such, the regu-
latory impact analysis bears little resemblance to the robust quantified 
analysis prescribed by Circular A-4.118 
Other aspects of centralized review were incomplete as well. For ex-
ample, the statement of need submitted to OMB along with the draft regu-
lation cast the proposal as a technical response to a technical problem.119 
But some alternative rationales were provided during the public relations 
effort surrounding the legislative effort that preceded the regulation and in 
the administrative public commentary on the proposed and final regulation. 
Both President Obama and Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew suggested 
 
American people have worked so hard to bring about. As part of this effort, Secretary Lew briefed me 
today on the first steps the Treasury Department is taking to discourage companies from taking ad-
vantage of corporate inversions . . . . I’m glad that Secretary Lew is exploring additional actions to help 
reverse this trend.”). 
115.  President Barack Obama, Remarks on Tax Code Reform and an Exchange with Reporters 
(Apr. 5, 2016) (“So I am very pleased that the Treasury Department has taken new action to prevent 
more corporations from taking advantage of one of the most insidious tax loopholes out there and flee-
ing the country just to get out of paying their taxes. This got some attention in the business press yester-
day, but I wanted to make sure that we highlighted the importance of Treasury’s action and why it did 
what it did.”). 
116.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, E.O. 13563 AND 12866 REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
(2016) [hereinafter EARNINGS STRIPPING RIA], http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2016-
0014-001 (follow “View Document”). 
117.  CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 6. 
118.  See supra notes 6–33 and accompanying text. 
119.  EARNINGS STRIPPING RIA, supra note 116. 
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that the policy was motivated by a desire to protect the fisc from lost reve-
nue.120 They also underscored concerns about fairness because large multi-
national corporations were using inversion transactions and earnings 
stripping in a way that was perceived to allow them to avoid paying taxes 
that they should owe—maneuvers that were not available to wholly domes-
tic corporations or to individuals.121 The statement of need did not address 
these concerns directly, although it did include a citation to a 2007 Treas-
ury report that estimated that earnings stripping cost Treasury more than 
$700 million of revenue in 2002 and 2003.122 By focusing on the technical 
issue, Treasury appeared not entirely forthcoming in its formal justification 
for the rule. 
This omission shaped the regulatory analysis that followed. The regula-
tory impact analysis did not specify what, if any, alternative policies Treas-
ury considered. For example, one part of the rule applied only to 
corporations with more than $50 million of outstanding related-party debt; 
another part applied only to corporations with more than $100 million of 
assets or $50 million of revenue.123 Presumably, Treasury could have con-
sidered alternatives that made the rule apply either more broadly or more 
narrowly. And other parts of the rule could have been altered to create a 
menu of different options that would cover different types of debt arrange-
ments in varying quantities and applying to different types of taxpayers. 
But it is unclear whether the rule as adopted was shaped in consideration of 
the revenue effects, fairness implications, or only based on more technical 
considerations, so it is not clear what sort of alternatives Treasury might 
have wanted to consider. 
This incomplete version of centralized review of the anti-inversion rule 
was perhaps the first sign that centralized review of tax regulations would 
soon garner increased interest. 
 
120.  Press Release, Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew on a 
Press Conference Call Regarding Announcement of Earnings Stripping (Oct. 13, 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0577.aspx (“Earnings stripping is . . . a 
contributing factor to the erosion of the U.S. corporate tax base.”). 
121.  Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Remarks by President Obama 
on the Economy (Apr. 5, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/05/ 
remarks-president-economy-0 (discussing the proposed regulations and describing inversion transac-
tions as allowing “big corporations” to “get out of paying their fair share of taxes here at home”). 
122.  DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON EARNINGS STRIPPING, 
TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 26 (2007). 
123.  EARNINGS STRIPPING RIA, supra note 116, at 2. 
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3. Trump Administration: Aspiring to Centralized Review 
The Trump Administration, from the outset, adopted a more heavy-
handed approach to directing tax regulatory actions, with OMB including 
tax regulations in its early anti-regulatory directives.124 President Trump 
used an executive order to instruct the Secretary of Treasury to “review” all 
significant tax regulations issued in the final year of the Obama Admin-
istration to determine if any of those regulations “impose(d) . . . financial 
burden(s) on United States taxpayers.”125 In April 2017, President Trump 
directed the Secretary of Treasury and the Director of the OMB to “review 
and, if appropriate, reconsider” the exemption of tax regulations from cen-
tralized review.126 Still, the Trump Administration’s regulatory agenda for 
tax regulations, released publicly in summer 2017, did not designate any 
tax regulations as “economically significant,” consistent with past practic-
es.127 
With the passage of the 2017 Tax Act, focus on centralized review be-
gan to sharpen, particularly as policymakers and the tax community digest-
ed the unusually broad delegations to the Executive Branch that were 
included in the new legislation.128 A conservative nonprofit issued a report 
 
124.  President Trump issued an Executive Order that called for two regulations to be revoked for 
every one new regulation finalized, and his Chief of Staff issued a directive to department heads that 
halts publication of new regulations and “guidance documents.” Exec. Order 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 
9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017); Reince Priebus, Memorandum from Reince Priebus, Assistant to the President & 
Chief of Staff, for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Regulatory Freeze Pending Review 
(Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-heads-executive-depart 
ments-agencies/. The IRS interpreted this to mean that it should cease publication of all but the most 
routine guidance (such as updating interest rates). Andrew Velarde & Emily L. Foster, No Substantive 
IRS Guidance Coming for a While, Official Says, TAX NOTES, (Feb. 27, 2017), www.taxnotes.com/edi 
tors-pick/no-substantive-irs-guidance-coming-while-official-says. 
125.  Exec. Order 13,789, § 2(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317 (Apr. 21, 2017) (being titled “Identifying 
and Reducing Tax Regulatory Burdens”; directing that “earlier determinations of whether a regulation 
is significant pursuant to Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993, as amended (Regulatory Plan-
ning and Review), shall not be controlling”). 
126.  Id. § 2(c). 
127.  Stephanie Cummings & Andrew Velarde, Regulatory Agenda Doesn’t Deem Any Tax Regs 
Significant, TAX NOTES: TAX NOTES TODAY (July 21, 2017), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-to 
day/tax-system-administration/regulatory-agenda-doesnt-deem-any-tax-regs-significant/2017/07/21/1v 
x32. 
128.  Congress made some very broad express delegations of authority in the 2017 Tax Act. 
Examples include the pass-through provision, described infra notes 189–92 and accompanying text; a 
provision that directs Treasury to determine who qualifies for a new special tax break on beer, 26 
U.S.C.A § 5051(a)(1) (West Supp. 2018); and a delegation of rulemaking authority to address how 
private equity partnerships can qualify for the long-term capital gains rate, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4061 (West 
Supp. 2018). Congress also left significant gaps that demand that Treasury exercise policymaking dis-
cretion. See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, Treasury Can Close a Potential Loophole in the Treatment of De-
ferred Foreign Income in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: Will It Act? (unpublished manuscript) (Dec. 26, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3093379 (follow “Open PDF in Browser”) 
(describing how a new provision imposing a tax on the deemed repatriation of deferred foreign income 
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criticizing the fact that tax regulations are not subject to centralized re-
view.129 Various congressional Republicans and conservative interest 
groups pushed the issue as well.130 
In April 2018, the Trump Administration issued a “new framework” 
providing for centralized review of tax regulations in the near future.131 The 
framework has three major components. First, it requires Treasury to keep 
OIRA abreast of its agenda by submitting quarterly “notices” of all 
“planned tax regulatory actions.”132 Second, it provides that OIRA will re-
view any regulatory actions that “create a serious inconsistency or other-
wise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency,” or that 
“raise novel legal or policy issues, such as by prescribing a rule of conduct 
backed by an assessable payment.”133 The treatment of this category of tax 
regulatory actions corresponds with the treatment of “significant” rules un-
der Executive Order 12,866—these rulemaking projects are subject to cen-
tralized review, but the drafting agency is not required to prepare a 
regulatory impact analysis.134 Third, the framework requires that actions 
that have “an annual non-revenue effect on the economy of $100 million or 
more,” be subject to plenary review as is required for “economically signif-
icant” regulations under Executive Order 12,866.135 This review calls for 
Treasury to produce quantified cost–benefit analysis of the proposed regu-
lation and alternatives.136 
 
is unclear as to how certain distributions from foreign income are to be accounted for, creating the 
possibility that multinational corporations could use such distributions to reduce tax liability, potentially 
by billions of dollars for a corporate taxpayer like Apple). 
129.  James Valvo, Evading Oversight: The Origins and Implications of the IRS Claim That Its 
Rules Do Not Have an Economic Impact, CAUSE OF ACTION INSTITUTE (2018), https://causeofacti 
on.org/evading-oversight-origins-implications-irs-claim-rules-not-economic-impact/; see supra note 14. 
130.  Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 
and James Lankford, Chairman, Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs & Fed. Mgmt., to Neomi Rao, 
Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs (Feb. 1, 2018); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, Sen-
ate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, and James Lankford, Chairman, Subcomm. on Regula-
tory Affairs & Fed. Mgmt., to David Kautter, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Feb. 13, 2018); Press 
Release, Cause of Action Inst., 17 Groups Urge Trump Administration to End Unlawful IRS Practice of 
Dodging Oversight (Feb. 27, 2018). 
131.  Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep’t of the Treasury and the Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget, Review of Tax Regulations under Executive Order 12866 (Apr. 11, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 
Treasury–OMB MOA], https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Trea 
sury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf. 
132.  Id. at 1. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id.; Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. § 645 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 (2012); see supra notes 48, 54–58 and accompanying text. 
135.  2018 Treasury–OMB MOA, supra note 131, at 1. 
136.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. §§ 645–46; supra notes 53–68 and 
accompanying text (describing review of economically significant regulations under Executive Order 
12,866). 
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Notably, the framework provides the agencies with up to a year from 
the date of the agreement (i.e., until April 12, 2019) to commence the full 
review that requires Treasury to produce quantified cost–benefit analysis 
(as part of the regulatory impact analysis). The expressed purpose of this 
delay is to allow Treasury and OIRA to “obtain[] reasonably sufficient re-
sources . . . to perform the required analyses.”137 
Parts of the framework are novel and parts are not.138 The regulatory 
agenda requirement does not mark a significant change from current Treas-
ury and Service practices. Treasury and the Service already produce an an-
nual “Priority Guidance Plan,” which is a list of planned regulatory actions, 
and it already updates that plan three times throughout the year (i.e., it re-
leases an updated priority list each quarter).139 The Priority Guidance Plan 
and agenda-setting process for tax regulations are already particularly ro-
bust and useful versions of the sort of regulatory agenda-setting prescribed 
under Executive Order 12,866: Treasury is vigilant about soliciting public 
input on agenda items, makes fairly accurate predictions of its capacity, and 
follows through on the items it places on the agenda. In addition, regular 
quarterly updates provide transparency as to how the projects are proceed-
ing.140 Thus, the new framework adds little substantively, but rather simply 
mandates that Treasury should provide the (already publicly available) 
agenda and updates directly to OIRA. The framework does not specify that 
the agenda should be provided to OIRA in advance of being made public. It 
specifies that, “[a]t the election of the OIRA Administrator, Treasury will 
engage in substantive consultation with OIRA regarding any” regulatory 
action that appears on the agenda.141 It is not clear from the memorandum 
what such engagement might consist of; regardless, such engagement was 
not prohibited previously. 
The other two elements of the framework, mandating review of all reg-
ulations and requiring cost–benefit analysis of certain significant regula-
 
137.  2018 Treasury–OMB MOA, supra note 131, at 3. 
138.  In addition to the points described above, the framework provides OIRA with forty-five 
days to review each rule (as compared to ninety days provided for under Executive Order 12,866), with 
additional time provided as necessary, and allows Treasury to request an “expedited” ten-business-day 
review. Id. at 1–2. 
139.  See Priority Guidance Plans, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/privacy-
disclosure/priority-guidance-plan (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (listing priority guidance plans dating back 
to 2000). Prior to 2011, the plan was updated twice a year, and prior to 2009 it was released annually 
with no mid-year updates. See id. 
140.  Compare INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2016–2017 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN, https://www 
.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2016-2017_pgp_initial.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2018), with INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., 2015–2016 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2015-2016_pgp_ ini-
tial.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2018) (detailing progress made since the prior year, with updates on the 
status of specific regulatory projects). 
141.  2018 Treasury–OMB MOA, supra note 131, at 1. 
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tions, potentially mark a sea-change in the process for producing tax regu-
lations. However, many important details—which could impact the effec-
tiveness and significance of centralized review—remain to be determined. 
The first category of tax regulations that OIRA plans to review is ill-
defined, although in broad strokes it appears reasonable: review is triggered 
if the drafted rule is inconsistent with or interferes with other policy, or 
raises a novel issue. A tax regulation could certainly produce policy results 
that are inconsistent with substantive policy overseen by other agencies.142 
However, the framework states that OIRA review applies if a proposed 
regulation presents a “serious inconsistency”; it is unclear how OIRA will 
distinguish between serious and minor potential inconsistencies. The sec-
ond definitional prong is similarly vague: a “novel legal or policy issue[]” 
appears straightforward, but is then exemplified as a “rule of conduct 
backed by an assessable payment.”143 In tax administration, such a rule is 
not novel; it is a tax or a penalty. It is unclear whether OIRA intends to (or 
believes it is authorized by the framework to require) review of any rule 
that can affect the amount of tax or penalty owed, or if this is more limited. 
It is also unclear whether this category only applies to rules that create such 
an assessment, or if it applies to rules that implement an assessment estab-
lished by Congress by statute. This play in the joints—serious versus mi-
nor, and what constitutes a novel tax rule—means that OIRA could 
conceivably use the new framework to impose centralized review on al-
most any tax regulation, or on almost none. 
The second category of tax regulations subject to review, those that 
have a $100 million effect on the economy, sounds familiar (because the 
number is drawn from Executive Order 12,866) but is perhaps even more 
undetermined. That category applies to rules that “have an annual non-
revenue effect on the economy of $100 million or more, measured against a 
no-action baseline.”144 The primary uncertainty here is how OIRA and 
Treasury define the “no action” baseline. Does that refer to a state of the 
world where Congress has not enacted a provision that requires regulatory 
action, or one where Congress has acted but Treasury provides no further 
guidance? If it is the latter, then the baseline will often be defined by partial 
compliance with a law as enacted.145 On the other hand, a baseline that as-
 
142.  See, e.g., infra notes 202–10 and accompanying text. 
143.  2018 Treasury–OMB MOA, supra note 131, at 1. 
144.  Id. 
145.  For an example, see the discussion of the forthcoming pass-through deduction regulations, 
infra notes 189–94 and accompanying text. Congress enacted a detailed statute that leaves many ques-
tions unanswered. If, hypothetically, Treasury abstained from issuing regulations, some taxpayers 
would use the statute as authority to claim the deduction, but likely not nearly as many as would do so if 
Treasury issued regulations that made clear who qualifies. 
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sumes the former—no action by Congress—presents strange counterfactual 
assumptions that will overestimate the effect that each tax regulatory action 
will have on the economy. 
Further confounding the question of what OIRA will review under this 
prong, OIRA and Treasury have entirely deferred the issue of how the 
“non-revenue effect on the economy of $100 million or more” will be cal-
culated.146 The first descriptor, “non-revenue effect,” makes clear that rev-
enue estimates are not relevant.147 Presumably, this means that Treasury 
will be focused on the costs and benefits of compliance and behavioral 
changes, and not on the amount of tax revenue collected. If Treasury relies 
on its existing compliance cost estimates, this requirement will simply 
weight review towards regulations that affect more taxpayers. Treasury 
calculates compliance costs by estimating time required and assigning var-
ied values to different people, as well as to types of professionals who as-
sist with tax return preparation (e.g., accountants versus lawyers).148 A few 
extra minutes spent on Form 1040 will easily cost more than $100 million, 
whereas a provision like the earnings stripping regulation—which is im-
mensely complicated, but affects only corporations that already have the 
capacity to comply—may not.149 Quantifying and monetizing behavioral 
changes presents its own set of challenges—discussed at length in Parts III 
and IV—that go far beyond simply ensuring that Treasury has enough time 
to hire the right people. 
In summary, the Trump Administration plans to start imposing central-
ized review, but as of now, it is not clear to which regulations that review 
will apply; whether it will be imposed categorically or in an ad hoc manner; 
how the review will be conducted; or, as a result of these points of uncer-
tainty, what potential effects centralized review might have on tax regula-
tions, procedurally and substantively. These issues are explored in greater 
detail in the Parts that follow. 
III. TRADE-OFFS IN CENTRALIZED REVIEW 
Why is it that tax regulations have not been subject to centralized re-
view, and how should such review proceed? The omission of tax regula-
tions from OMB review is surprising, because the tax system is an essential 
element of each of the two components of the federal bureaucracy that 
OMB oversees: tax policy is an important tool for implementing regulatory 
 
146.  2018 Treasury–OMB MOA, supra note 131, at 1. 
147.  See id. 
148.  Adam M. Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L.J. 279, 295 (2015). 
149.  See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text. Treasury estimated compliance costs for 
that regulation of $13 million. EARNINGS STRIPPING RIA, supra note 116. 
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policy, and raising revenue is central to the fiscal system. Although the lack 
of centralized review was occasionally acknowledged by scholars150 and is 
now at least purportedly in the process of being reshaped,151 the normative 
foundations for reviewing or not reviewing have not received close scruti-
ny. 
This Part explores the potential advantages and disadvantages of im-
posing centralized review on tax regulations by reference to forthcoming 
rules addressing the new pass-through deduction152 and the recently final-
ized smoking-cessation rule, each described below.153 
A. Politicization vs. Political Accountability 
The conventional explanation for why tax regulations are most often 
produced in a manner that diverges from standard administrative proce-
dures relates to politicization. This term invokes negative connotations that 
make it distinct from the normative goal of political accountability, but as 
discussed below, politicization and political accountability are very much 
connected. Politicization of tax collection has long been a concern, whereas 
political accountability for regulatory tax policymaking may be desirable. 
Are tax regulations in the tax administration and enforcement domain 
where lessons from history about the perils of politicization are instructive? 
Or are tax regulations a form of policymaking that really should be politi-
cized so as to make the President accountable for policy decisions? 
The prospect of political accountability may actually keep presidents 
(and their closest political appointees) away from the tax policymaking 
process. From this view, perhaps the reason tax regulations have not previ-
ously been subject to centralized review is simply because presidential ad-
ministrations prefer to stay separated from the unpopular work of raising 
revenue. Centralized review is credited with facilitating presidential “own-
ership” of regulatory policy and marking resultant policy with presidential 
approval.154 But when policies are unpopular, as is the case with at least 
 
150.  E.g., Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter 
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 1016 n.320 (“The IRS does not typically engage in the 
cost-benefit analysis required of some other agencies under Executive Order 12,866, typically taking 
the position that the rulemaking is not a ‘significant regulatory action,’ meaning, among other things, 
that it will not have an annual economic effect of $100 million or more.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Financial 
Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124 YALE L.J. F. 263, 268 n.25 (2015) (“There is a longstanding 
exemption, based on practice rather than the text of any relevant Executive Order, for rules from the 
Internal Revenue Service.”). 
151.  See supra Section II.B.3. 
152.  See infra notes 189–92 and accompanying text. 
153.  See infra notes 202–10 and accompanying text. 
154.  Sunstein, supra note 150, at 269–70 (considering presidential oversight in financial regula-
tions, many of which are promulgated by independent agencies and thus are exempt from OIRA over-
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some tax regulations that raise revenue, presidents do not want this sort of 
ownership and appearance of approval. A similar theory has been offered 
for why presidents have not imposed centralized review of financial regula-
tions.155 Recent Administrations have rarely used presidential directives 
and public actions to proactively support revenue-raising regulations in any 
manner, let alone through centralized review.156 Presidential avoidance of 
tax administration is poignantly illustrated by the fact that President Ken-
nedy was the last and only President ever to visit the IRS in person.157 
Various institutional arrangements and norms developed over the 
course of the twentieth century that were intended to keep politics out of 
tax administration. In the early decades of the income tax, the system was 
administered and taxes were collected by regional “Collectors of Internal 
Revenue,” positions that were patronage appointments made by the Presi-
dent.158 In the 1920s, congressional investigators asserted that tax adminis-
trators had too much autonomy and that the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
should depoliticize tax collection by “promulgat[ing] and publish[ing] the 
principles and practices to be followed in determining tax liability.”159 But 
nonetheless, the patronage system persisted until the 1950s, when a series 
of corruption scandals among the collectors resulted in purging hundreds of 
government employees involved in tax collection.160 After the scandal 
 
sight; stating that “some Presidents might be cautious about subjecting financial regulation to the OIRA 
process, because that step would force the Executive Office of the President, and the President personal-
ly, to ‘own’ the decisions of financial regulators. If, for example, the SEC were subject to the OIRA 
process, the President would be blamed for its decisions, which might be an unwelcome complication. 
It might be better, from the standpoint of the President himself, to be able to maintain a degree of dis-
tance from financial regulators’ decisions. Such distance could serve as a kind of ‘enabling constraint’ 
in which the President’s authority is, in an important respect, increased if and because the decisions of 
financial regulators cannot be directly attributed to him. Of course there is a countervailing point, which 
is that without the OIRA process or some surrogate for it, the President cannot control such decisions, 
even if he believes them to be misdirected or wrong”). 
155.  Id. 
156.  See Hemel, supra note 110, at 651–52 (“It does not appear that the President has ever issued 
a memorandum directing the Treasury or the IRS to take regulatory action on a tax-specific issue.”). 
The Obama-era earnings-stripping regulation is the single significant counterexample. See supra Sec-
tion II.B.2. Even the Clinton Administration, reputed for liberal use of presidential memoranda to direct 
agencies to take particular actions, see Kagan, supra note 4, made no such tax-related directives. See 
Papers of Bill Clinton, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://goo.gl/7k9u23 (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). 
157.  President Kennedy visited the IRS in April of 1961 at the invitation of IRS Commissioner 
Mortimer Caplin. Colby Itkowitz, This 100-year-old Public Servant Is from a Time When Americans 
Still Believed in Government, WASH. POST (July 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
inspired-life/wp/2016/07/08/this-100-year-old-public-servant-is-from-a-time-when-americans-still-belie 
ved-in-government/?utm_term=.3d16c539fcd0. 
158.  See Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 751, 756 (2001) (citing S. REP. NO. 69-27, at 229 (1926)); George K. Yin, 
James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, the “Greatest Tax Suit in the History of the World,” and the Creation 
of the Joint Committee on Taxation and Its Staff, 66 TAX L. REV. 787, 842–48 (2013). 
159.  See Thorndike, supra note 158, at 751. 
160.  Id. at 757–59. 
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broke, organizational reforms limited Treasury’s role in IRS affairs, creat-
ing a “generally independent structure.”161 At the same time, the congres-
sional committee investigating the scandals determined that greater 
transparency in tax administration, and specifically greater reliance on os-
tensibly apolitical published guidance interpreting the tax laws, would be 
an important reform of tax administration.162 This gave rise to the modern-
day system of tax regulations and a variety of regularly published guid-
ance.163 
Politicization of tax administration once again gained public attention 
when Richard Nixon’s attempts to use the IRS for political ends was ex-
posed during impeachment proceedings. Nixon sought direct audits of his 
political enemies and sought information from their tax returns.164 As a di-
rect result, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,165 Congress imposed strict lim-
its on the availability of tax returns and the disclosure of tax return 
information to prevent the White House from directing IRS activities for 
untoward purposes.166 
The combination of investigations and institutional reforms in the 
1920s and 1950s and significant privacy protections enacted in the 1970s 
created an environment in which tax administration has—for the last four 
decades or so—been treated with particular sensitivity by Presidents and 
political appointees in the Executive Office of the President. In the late 
1990s, Congress remained notably focused on ensuring that the IRS re-
mained “insulated from political interference.”167 
Today, the structure of the tax policymaking apparatus, and presiden-
tial appointment power for the key roles in that apparatus, mixes the hall-
marks of agency independence and presidential control. The Commissioner 
of the IRS is removable by the President at-will, as are the IRS Chief 
 
161.  NAT’L COMM’N ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., A VISION FOR A NEW 
IRS 12 (1997) [hereinafter A VISION FOR A NEW IRS]. 
162.  Thorndike, supra note 158, at 759 (citing SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE LAWS, 82ND CONG., REPORT ON INTERNAL REVENUE INVESTIGATION 30 (Subcomm. Print 
1952)). 
163.  Id. 
164.  Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. 265, 278–79 (2011) 
(summarizing the Nixon Administration’s attempts to use the IRS and taxpayer information for political 
purposes); David J. Herzig, Justice for All: Reimagining the Internal Revenue Service, 33 VA. TAX 
REV. 1, 25–26 (2013). 
165.  Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520. 
166.  Blank, supra note 164, at 279–80; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., CONF. 
COMPARISON ON H.R. 10612: TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 55–59 (Comparitive Comm. Print 1976). 
167.  A VISION FOR A NEW IRS, supra note 161, at 12–13. A report issued in the late 1990s by a 
congressionally appointed commission proposed various reforms to the IRS, including a five-year term 
for the IRS Commissioner. See id. Congress adopted this proposal, continuing the trend of insulating 
tax administration from the White House. 26 U.S.C. § 7803(a)(1) (2012). 
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Counsel and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy.168 The 
Chief Counsel plays an important role within the IRS, which includes over-
seeing litigation; providing legal advice and interpretations of tax law to the 
Commissioner, to IRS field staff, and to taxpayers; and drafting regulations 
and legislative proposals.169 The Chief Counsel generally reports to the 
Commissioner, but as part of congressional attempts to separate administra-
tion from policymaking (and from politicization), is directed by Congress 
to report exclusively to the General Counsel for the Department of the 
Treasury on matters related to tax policy.170 The Commissioner is remova-
ble by the President, and the Commissioner has statutory authority to rec-
ommend the removal of the Chief Counsel to the President.171 In short, the 
lines of authority from the President are blurred. Treasury has attempted to 
“retain[] its rightful place as the developer of tax policy for the executive 
branch” while deliberately staying “removed from tax administration.”172 
From the Nixon White House until 2016, norms developed—and re-
mained intact across administrations and without regard to party—that limit 
White House engagement with all aspects of tax administration, including 
oversight and enforcement, and regulatory policymaking. For example, the 
National Economic Council (NEC), within the Executive Office of the 
President, often takes the lead in prompting and crafting regulatory initia-
tives that are top presidential priorities.173 But the NEC has avoided engag-
ing with tax regulations in this manner.174 Instead, tax regulations are 
produced solely within the Department of the Treasury (except in instances 
when tax regulations are jointly issued by Treasury and another agency or 
department). The IRS procedures for producing tax regulations specify that 
the drafting team at the IRS and Treasury should not disclose the draft rule 
or information about it outside of Treasury Department until it is published 
as a proposed rule for public comment.175 The procedures provide an ex-
 
168.  A VISION FOR A NEW IRS, supra note 161, at 12–13; see CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & 
MICHAEL GREEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30959, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS 
REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES HANDLING NOMINATIONS 24 (2017). 
169.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
IRM § 1.1.6.1 (2015). 
170.  26 U.S.C. § 7803(b)(3) (2012) (providing that, for tax litigation issues and “legal advice or 
interpretation of the tax law not relating solely to tax policy,” the Chief Counsel reports to both the 
Commissioner and the General Counsel). 
171.  26 U.S.C. § 7803(a)(2). 
172.  A VISION FOR A NEW IRS, supra note 161, at 12. 
173.  Since the Clinton Administration, the NEC has been charged with coordinating economic 
policy. National Economic Council, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/ 
national-economic-council (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
174.  This was relayed to this author orally by a former NEC official. 
175.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CONFIDENTIALITY, IRM § 32.1.1.5 (generally disallowing 
dissemination of draft regulations outside of the Department of the Treasury prior to publication in the 
Federal Register). 
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ception for “routine coordination necessary with other government agen-
cies (e.g., Department of Labor and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
on pension regulations),” which suggests that the procedure allows for in-
tra-government sharing only with jointly issued regulations.176 
Towards the end of the Obama Administration, OIRA staff expressed 
that their sensitivity about politicizing tax administration extended to cen-
tralized review of tax regulations, remaining consistent with Administra-
tions not wanting to appear to be involved in regulatory tax 
policymaking.177 And former Treasury and Service officials have claimed 
that submitting tax regulations for OIRA review would inevitably politicize 
the rulemaking process in a way that would be harmful for the substance of 
tax regulations, although the specific concern here with regard to tax regu-
lations is not exactly clear.178 In contrast, over the last forty years, oversight 
of the other areas of the administrative state by political appointees in or 
near the White House has notably increased, a move that has been justified 
normatively by scholars and policymakers.179 
The optimistic justification for politicization is that having political 
personnel involved in policy decisions establishes political accountability. 
The basic claim to political accountability in the Executive Branch is that 
presidential imprimatur creates a “link” between the electorate and the pol-
icy decisions that emerge from the Executive Branch.180 Proponents of cen-
tralized review argue that it can strengthen this link by inserting OMB 
political personnel who are close to the White House—physically and also 
in terms of familiarity and commitment to the President’s policy goals—
into the regulation-drafting process.181 
In addition to establishing processes to ensure that policies reflect the 
priorities of the elected president, political accountability in the regulatory 
process is fostered by transparency. Transparency includes making clear 
 
176.  Id. 
177.  See GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 26 (expressing that abstaining from centralized review 
of tax regulations was intended “to insulate the Executive Office of the President from the charge that it 
might use OMB’s review of IRS for political purposes”). 
178.  Jeremiah Coder, Why Treasury Tax Regulations Are Rarely ‘Significant,’ TAX NOTES: TAX 
NOTES TODAY, at 872, Aug. 20, 2012; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 26 (“[O]ne historic ra-
tionale for the agreement was to insulate the Executive Office of the President from the charge that it 
might use OMB’s review of IRS for political purposes.”). 
179.  See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW 
SYSTEM CASES AND MATERIALS 326–28 (7th ed. 2014) (providing a concise overview of the develop-
ment of White House regulatory oversight from the Nixon Administration through the Obama Admin-
istration, with emphasis on establishing presidential control); see supra Subpart II.A. 
180.  Kagan, supra note 4, at 2331–32; Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative 
Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1411–12 (2013). 
181.  E.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 1081; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 3–4. 
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the tradeoffs inherent in policy decisions.182 This is especially lacking cur-
rently in tax regulations; with no publicly available revenue estimates, it is 
oftentimes totally unclear how a particular tax regulation will affect the 
fiscal position of the U.S. government. The need for a broad perspective on 
the implications of any given policy is a longstanding justification for cen-
tralized review.183 It seems particularly important in the tax-regulation con-
text; the revenue effects of alternative versions of the regulation have 
implications for government spending and borrowing in the future. 
Political accountability may be an antidote to a potential concern with 
tax regulations: capture of the regulatory process. Agency “capture” de-
scribes the concern than an agency can be controlled or unduly influenced 
by the interests it is intended to regulate, at the expense of the public inter-
est.184 In the tax regulation context, capture can consist of seeking to shape 
regulations to avoid increased tax liability or increased private costs. This 
could be accomplished by blocking a regulation that would increase tax 
liability or by shaping a regulation to carve out an industry or set of tax-
payers who would otherwise face increased tax liability. Whatever the par-
ticular manifestation, capture in the tax contexts looks very similar to 
capture in other contexts: well-organized interest groups can take ad-
vantage of superior information (for example, technical understanding of 
the subject matter that regulations are focused on) and procedural protec-
tions built into the regulatory process to shape outcomes, often at the ex-
pense of the diffuse and unorganized public.185 
The extent to which the tax regulatory process is susceptible to capture 
is subject to debate. Because the tax system affects essentially every person 
and every industry in the country, Treasury and the Service are not prone to 
the sort of single-industry-focused pressures that arise with more narrowly 
focused regulators.186 On the other hand, the participants in the notice-and- 
comment process for tax regulations are highly skewed towards organized 
 
182.  See generally Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 149 (2012). 
183.  Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking, 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-9 (1989) (“An effective 
mechanism is needed to coordinate agency decisions with the judgments of officials having a broader 
perspective, such as the President and Congress.”). 
184.  See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY 
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 19–25 (2008); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Can 
Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 34, at 
292, 296–98; Yackee, supra note 34, at 420, 426. 
185.  See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1326 (2010). 
186.  Cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural 
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1178 (1993) (describing tax 
committees in Congress as having “numerous and diverse constituencies” as compared to the “fewer 
and more homogeneous pressures” of more specialized committees). 
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interests, with very few public interest participants.187 And tax regulation 
writing is largely a “closed process” with little transparency (even when 
Treasury uses notice and comment), which makes it highly susceptible to 
capture, which may not be outwardly apparent.188 The potential for capture 
may skew tax regulation to favor taxpayers with greater resources. 
The forthcoming pass-through regulations are useful to expose the po-
tential pros and cons of politicizing regulatory tax policy. The 2017 Tax 
Act provides, in a new section 199A, that certain income from businesses 
that are taxed as pass-throughs—meaning that the income of the business 
appears on the tax return of the individual owner or owners—will be eligi-
ble for a special 20% deduction.189 In some respects, Congress acted in typ-
ical fashion, consistent with how it has produced tax legislation in the past: 
it created an exceedingly complicated statutory scheme that limits the 
amount of the deduction for certain businesses based on how much a pass-
through business spends on a combination of payroll expenses and capital 
investments. The deduction is capped at either 50% of W-2 wage expenses, 
or 25% of W-2 wage expenses plus 2.5% of the original cost of “qualified 
property.”190 
But Congress left various critically important issues in section 199A 
for the Executive Branch to sort out on its own. Perhaps most challenging, 
section 199A establishes differential rates as between distinct types of ser-
vices, but it does not establish which services qualify for the low rate and 
which do not. The deduction is expressly disallowed for high-earning law-
yers and doctors, and expressly not disallowed for engineers and archi-
tects.191 At the same time, the qualifying services cannot include “any trade 
or business where the principal asset of such trade or business is the reputa-
tion or skill of 1 or more of its employees.”192 Treasury’s regulations must 
specify which specific service businesses qualify for the deduction—do 
architecture firms built on the reputation of employees qualify or not? 
Should they be treated differently than general contracting businesses built 
on the reputation of employees? What about firms providing support ser-
 
187.  Wallace, supra note 17, at 219–24. 
188.  Zelinsky, supra note 186, at 1173 (“[R]elatively closed processes, less visible to some 
groups or to the general public than to other groups, are more easily captured by the interests that can 
readily monitor those processes and therefore intelligently punish and reward such processes’ deci-
sionmakers.”). 
189.  26 U.S.C.A. § 199A (West Supp. 2018); Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
§ 11011(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2063; H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 10–19 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). 
190.  26 U.S.C.A. § 199A(b)(2)(B) (West Supp.). 
191.  Id. at § 199A(d)(2)(A) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1202(e)(3)(A) (2012) (defining specified services 
by reference to a list that includes lawyers, doctors, engineers, and architects)) (directing that the engi-
neers and architects should be omitted from the list). 
192.  26 U.S.C. § 1202(e)(3)(A). 
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vices to reputation-based firms? For example, if office support for a reputa-
tion-based service is a qualifying business, can a reputation-based service 
spin off its support functions into a separate entity and receive a partial de-
duction?193 
The regulation that will define “reputation or skill” creates huge oppor-
tunities for political favoritism not grounded in any defensible policy ra-
tionale. Perhaps reality television stars should be exempt—i.e., should 
qualify for the deduction—because the genre has friends in high places? 
And perhaps it is better for the White House to make the final decision and 
to be known to be the decision-maker. Congress gave no hint as to how 
these sorts of questions should be resolved, and there is little additional 
explanation of the meaning or purpose of the provisions from the Joint 
Committee on Taxation. Indeed, there are not any clear underlying purpos-
es to the provisions that might offer some semblance of consistency as to 
who should and who should not be able to take advantage of the deduc-
tion.194 The end result is that Treasury must act—through regulations and 
other forms of guidance—to clarify how the rules should work, who is 
permitted to take the deduction, and who is not so permitted. But these reg-
ulations will necessarily involve significant policy decisions that affect dis-
tribution between owners and workers, between industries, within 
industries, and between current and future taxpayers, all of which seem like 
political issues, for which public accountability would be desirable. 
In short, the line drawing between services seems inherently political 
and appropriate for politically accountable decision-makers. In contrast, the 
earnings stripping regulation exhibits the absurdity of trying to depoliticize 
inherently political tax policy: centralized review conducted for that regula-
tion was hindered because the Administration obfuscated the purposes, 
shrouding behavioral effects, revenue concerns, and distributional goals in 
technical tax-policy-implementing sort of language. Greater transparency 
as to political decision-making could increase accountability and limit neg-
ative politicization. But the lines can be blurry between political involve-
ment that promotes accountability and politicization that potentially taints 
tax administration. 
 
193.  David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches 
Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 21–22), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3089423. 
194.  See id. at 16–18; Daniel Shaviro, Evaluating the New US Pass-Through Rules, BRIT. TAX 
REV., no. 1, 2018, at 49, 51, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141521. 
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B. Systematizing Analysis 
This Subpart considers how qualitative and quantitative analysis could 
be part of the centralized review process and how such analysis might be 
conducted as applied to tax regulations. Circular A-4 expressly excludes 
transfer payments from consideration in cost–benefit analysis,195 and 
OIRA’s annual report on the costs and benefits of federal regulations has, 
in recent years, included a very brief statement distinguishing transfer regu-
lations from typical regulations: “Budgetary transfer rules are rules that 
primarily cause income transfers usually from taxpayers to program benefi-
ciaries. Agencies typically do not estimate possible resulting distortionary 
effects on the economy.”196 
Thus, analysis of transfers—tax or otherwise—is generally relegated to 
budget tables. The budget is a measure of the government’s “fiscal posi-
tion,” employed in the legislative process as a tool for making “trade-offs 
between different uses of resources.”197 But the practice of analyzing tax 
policy strictly through budgetary tools belies ambiguity about whether tax 
policy is distinct from other types of regulatory policy. Dan Shaviro illus-
trated this point: “[O]ne might think of minimum wage laws either as 
workplace regulation, involving the organization of a mandatory cartel 
among low-wage workers, or as equivalent to an off-budget tax on the em-
ployers of such workers accompanied by an off-budget transfer to those 
same workers.”198 Of course, a minimum wage could also be accomplished 
by way of an on-budget tax on employers and a transfer back to workers, 
managed by the government and reflected in the federal budget. Shaviro 
concludes that the “rationale for distinguishing between the fiscal system 
 
195.  See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 6, at 38. 
196.  OIRA 2016 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 38, at 8 n.15. And later: “[F]or budgetary transfer 
rules, benefits and costs are generally not estimated because agencies typically estimate budgetary 
impacts instead.” Id. at 63 n.134. This language echoes similar language in reports from previous years. 
See OIRA Reports to Congress, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
omb/inforeg_regpol_reports_congress/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
197.  David Kamin, Risky Returns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 IND. L.J. 723, 
727 (2013). The many rules and practices related to enacting taxing and spending policies within budget 
constraints, as well as measuring budget effects of legislation, all contribute to the basic purpose of 
reflecting the government’s fiscal position and requiring trade-offs between on-budget expenditures. In 
arguing that the federal budget should not account for certain risks that have no fiscal effect, Kamin 
comments, “[P]olicymaking should, to the extent possible, take into account the full costs and benefits 
of policies; that is how resource allocation should be done. . . . However, budgeting is a different exer-
cise than cost-benefit analysis.” Id. at 728. 
198.  Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 
190 (2004). 
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and everything else the government does is simply ease of measure-
ment.”199 
Therein lies an enormous challenge for centralized review of tax regu-
lations, and for analysis of tax policy more generally: revenue estimates are 
challenging enough to produce but nonetheless provide incomplete infor-
mation about the effects of tax policy. While budget analysis facilitates 
some trade-offs in policymaking—i.e., what level of resources are available 
for public spending—it does not attempt to manage or to engage directly 
with the “social costs” of such trade-offs, nor with the benefits of policy 
alternatives.200 This means that analyzing tax policy strictly through budg-
ets leaves out important considerations in tax policymaking.201 Although 
distributional analysis sometimes accompanies revenue estimates, this 
analysis is generally limited. And none of these tools are regularly applied 
to the tax regulatory process and made available for public consumption 
during that process. 
Centralized review outside of tax often includes cost–benefit analysis, 
and proponents and critics of centralized review have explored the possibil-
ity of integrating distributional analysis into that review. This Subpart con-
siders each—cost–benefit analysis and distributional analysis—in turn, as 
applied to tax regulations. Together, these modes of analysis have the po-
tential to illuminate a diversity of trade-offs necessary in formulating tax 
regulations. 
A recently finalized tax regulation, issued as part of Treasury’s efforts 
to implement the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate,” illustrates 
how useful this sort of analysis could be.202 The individual mandate was 
intended to prompt individuals to acquire health insurance coverage that 
 
199.  Id. David Bradford and Shaviro illustrated this point most absurdly, imagining the possibil-
ity of replacing all weapons procurement spending carried out by the Department of Defense with a tax 
credit for weapons production, offered to the same manufacturers for the same amounts as would have 
been paid directly. Id. at 197 (citing David F. Bradford, Reforming Budgetary Language, in PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE NEW CENTURY 93–116 (Sijbren Cnossen & Hans-Werner Sinn 
eds., 2003)). 
200.  Kamin, supra note 197, at 737 (arguing that the federal budget should not be used for such 
purposes). 
201.  This critique may also apply to spending, but congressional appropriations are enacted 
annually and are generally subject to significant scrutiny. This does raise an oddity in tax policymaking 
that has been recognized only partially in the literature: tax expenditures are widely viewed as not re-
ceiving sufficient oversight, but nonetheless, when tax expenditures are shaped by Treasury through 
regulations, these regulations are not subject to centralized review or cost–benefit analysis. Scholars 
have widely criticized the distinction between fiscal functions and other functions as too blurred to 
justify treating tax policy differently than other types of policy, focusing on the legislative process for 
so-called tax expenditures. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How 
Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
202.  See Minimum Essential Coverage and Other Rules Regarding the Shared Responsibility 
Payment for Individuals, 79 Fed. Reg. 70,464 (Nov. 26, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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meets particular specifications.203 It is implemented through a detailed stat-
utory and regulatory scheme, and the focus here is on one particular regula-
tory provision: a rule establishing tobacco-related “wellness program 
incentives.”204 The final regulation included a rule that is apparently de-
signed to discourage smoking, but the rule was adopted without close con-
sideration of the trade-offs involved. It seems at least possible that the rule 
results in costs that exceed benefits, and that these costs will largely be 
borne by low-income people. None of these issues were subject to quantita-
tive analysis. 
The Affordable Care Act and prior legislation allows employer-
provided health insurance plans to include monetary incentives for certain 
healthy behavior, such as regularly exercising or abstaining from tobacco 
use. For example, a health insurance plan might have a total annual cost of 
$6,000 per covered individual, of which $4,500 is paid by the employer, 
and $1,500 is paid by the employee. Under the wellness program incentive 
rules, a plan could include a $500 discount off the employee portion, if the 
employee joins a gym and regularly makes use of it, and an additional 
$1,000 discount for abstaining from smoking or seeking help to stop smok-
ing. With these incentives in place, any regular gym-goers who are also 
non-smokers would end up paying $0 for the coverage, while smokers who 
did not workout at a gym would pay the full $1,500.205 
Section 5000A requires that individuals have health insurance, but pro-
vides an exemption such that the penalty is not imposed if a person did not 
have sufficient income to afford the plan made available to the person 
through her employer.206 (In 2019, the penalty amount will be $0, effective-
 
203.  The individual mandate was effectively repealed as part of the 2017 Tax Act, but curiously, 
Congress’s approach to repeal was simply to reduce the penalty for failure to meet the insurance re-
quirement to $0 (from around $700 or more per person), starting in 2019. Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. 
No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092. That means that the regulations remain fully in force for 
2018, and after that, the requirements will remain on the books, as will the regulations implementing the 
requirement and facilitating the process for exemptions from the mandate. 
204.  Treas. Reg. § 1.5000A-3(e)(3)(ii)(F) (as amended in 2016). I have not attempted to estimate 
whether the tobacco-cessation rule might trigger the $100 million threshold under Executive Order 
12,866. See supra note 51. If 150,000 people were subject to the penalty because of the rule, it would 
have resulted in approximately $100 million of penalty revenue for the government, although those 
revenues are transfers that could potentially trigger centralized review as economically significant on 
that basis alone. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. It seems almost certain that the entire set of 
proposed rules under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A would have done so—for example, another piece of the rule 
provided that a person is deemed to have coverage for the entire month for purposes of determining 
penalty liability if they have coverage for a single day during the month. Treas. Reg. § 1.5000A-1 (as 
amended in 2016). If this rule affected penalty payments or insurance coverage decisions for just a 
fraction of the 28.5 million uninsured people, it would surely amount to over $100 million. 
205.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 54.9802-1(f)(5)(ii) (as amended in 2014) (describing, in Example 2, 
the operation of incentives for tobacco-cessation programs as part of wellness programs permitted under 
the Public Health Service Act as amended by the Affordable Care Act). 
206.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1) (2012) (exempting “[i]ndividuals who cannot afford coverage”). 
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ly repealing the individual mandate absent further action by Congress.207) 
Congress provided that a plan is unaffordable for purposes of the individual 
mandate if the employee’s required contribution is more than 8% of the 
employee’s household income.208 Congress defined household income and 
delegated to Treasury the task of determining exactly how to calculate the 
required contribution. 
The regulation is performing classic gap-filling: although Congress did 
not expressly direct Treasury and the IRS to issue regulations to deal with 
this particular issue within Code section 5000A, it is unenforceable and 
impossible to administer consistently without fleshing out numerous de-
tails, including how to calculate the “required contribution” amount and 
how to account for incentives provided in wellness programs when calcu-
lating affordability. 
The final regulation that Treasury produced provided that the 8% cal-
culation will not count tobacco-cessation benefits as actual costs to the em-
ployee.209 That is, the employee cannot account for failure to qualify for the 
tobacco-cessation benefit as part of the cost of the insurance. Thus, in cal-
culating affordability, the example plan described above would automati-
cally be treated as costing an individual employee $500 out of pocket: the 
$1,500 sticker price minus the $1,000 tobacco wellness benefit, regardless 
of whether the employee qualifies for that benefit. However, the plan only 
truly costs $500 for employees who actually qualify for the smoking-
cessation benefit. 
Counting or not counting a tobacco wellness benefit can make a big 
difference in determining whether health coverage is affordable. For exam-
ple, an employee who had household income of $7,000 per month would 
not qualify for an affordability exemption because the deemed $500 em-
ployee contribution is 7.1% of household income. But if the employee was 
not eligible for the smoking-cessation benefit (that is, the employee is a 
smoker and does not participate in an antismoking program), then the actu-
al cost to the employee could be as much as $1,500 per month, which is 
21.4% of household income. Nonetheless, even with $1,500 of out-of-
pocket costs per month, the regulation provides that the employee would 
not qualify for exemption from the penalty because only the $500 part of 
 
207.  The provision is not actually being excised from the tax code, and the Regulation will ap-
parently remain on the books. See supra note 203. 
208.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(4)(B) (2012) (defining household income by reference to other provi-
sions of the Tax Code). 
209.  Treas. Reg. § 1.5000A-3(e)(3)(ii)(F) (as amended in 2016); Minimum Essential Coverage 
and Other Rules Regarding the Shared Responsibility Payment for Individuals, 79 Fed. Reg. 70,464, 
70,467 (Nov. 26, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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the cost of the insurance (deemed the “unearned” benefit in the language of 
the regulation) counts for purposes of calculating the exemption. 
The preamble to the final regulation as published (without centralized 
review) explains that the rationale for the ultimately adopted rule was con-
nected to the ACA’s healthcare goals: the rule is justified as “consistent 
with policies related to tobacco use reflected in the Affordable Care Act, 
such as allowing issuers to charge higher premiums based on tobacco 
use.”210 Treating all employees as qualifying for the smoking-cessation 
program regardless of the reality extends the individual mandate penalty to 
a group of low-income people who would otherwise be exempt from it. In 
so doing, it potentially creates incentives for those low-income people to 
accept and pay for health insurance, and then further to participate in the 
smoking-cessation program offered under their plan; otherwise, they either 
will be subject to the penalty or take on health insurance that may be truly 
unaffordable. But on the other hand, it may result in the affected population 
paying the penalty, since the insurance (without the smoking-cessation 
benefit) may cost more than the penalty, so they might feel they have no 
choice. 
When this provision was proposed, it was not subjected to centralized 
review by OIRA, and Treasury did not undertake regulatory impact analy-
sis, nor did it develop a statement of need for the proposed action or ex-
plore possible alternatives.211 But what if the rule had gone through 
centralized review as an economically significant rule? 
1. Cost–Benefit Analysis 
For (nontax) “economically significant” regulations,212 OIRA instructs 
that the drafting agency must evaluate the costs and benefits of the proposal 
and the leading alternative approaches, and thus, the agency must deter-
mine which options should be treated as the top alternatives. This analysis 
is very much focused on the effects of various alternative rules on private 
behavior. With the smoking-cessation regulation described above, there 
was no public discussion of these alternative manifestations of the rule be-
fore it was finalized.  
If this approach were applied to consider alternatives with regard to 
how to treat smoking-cessation programs, there are six possibilities that 
could have been discussed:  
 
210.  Minimum Essential Coverage and Other Rules Regarding the Shared Responsibility Pay-
ment for Individuals, 79 Fed. Reg. at 70,467. 
211.  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
212.  See supra notes 51–52. 
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1. The rule as proposed, counting such programs as “earned,” while 
counting other wellness incentives as unearned;  
2. Counting other wellness incentives as earned but counting smok-
ing-cessation programs as unearned;  
3. Counting all wellness incentives as earned;  
4. Counting all wellness incentives as unearned;  
5. Establishing some process to allow calculations to reflect the 
wellness incentives that a taxpayer actually qualified for, thus ac-
tually establishing whether a taxpayer’s costs exceed the congres-
sionally mandated affordability threshold; or 
6. Considering whether there was some alternative regulatory or 
non-regulatory approach to further the goal of discouraging to-
bacco use, as encouraged by OIRA guidance (e.g., could some 
other anti-tobacco intervention be packaged with the communica-
tions related to compliance with the individual mandate?).213 
To carry out cost–benefit analysis of the proposal and alternatives, 
Treasury would first identify a baseline against which to measure costs and 
benefits. One approach—although there are alternatives—would be to as-
sume a world in which there were a cost-free, perfect measurement of each 
employee’s actual cost of healthcare coverage. Then, alternative proposals 
could be compared based on (1) expected degree of replication of the per-
fect measurement and (2) administrative and compliance costs. 
Next, Treasury would outline the anticipated costs and benefits of each 
alternative. These might include the following:  
 Compliance costs for taxpayers and their employers, for calculat-
ing whether coverage is affordable;  
 Enforcement and error costs for the Service, for confirming 
whether taxpayers have accurately determined that they are ex-
empt from the individual-mandate penalty;  
 Costs or benefits resulting from changes in behavior, including 
whether deeming coverage affordable changes healthcare plan 
consumption or uptake of smoking-cessation programs resulting 
from including or not including the benefit in the affordability 
calculation; and 
 Costs or benefits arising from whether and how the smoking-
cessation programs affect smoking behavior.  
 
213.  OIRA suggests considering different forms of communication, different default rules, and 
various other outside-the-box alternatives to the proposed regulation. See supra notes 64–66. Given the 
broader health care policy context, Treasury might have ruled out option 2 as running counter to Con-
gress’s desired policy to discourage smoking (by instead undermining the incentive effect of smoking-
cessation programs). Similarly, option 3 would seem to undermine the congressional goal of affordabil-
ity by making plans appear to be less expensive than they actually are for many employees. That would 
have left the regulation as adopted, along with alternatives 4, 5, and 6. 
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Additional consideration might be given to collection of the individual-
mandate penalty. 
With potential costs and benefits identified, Treasury would attempt to 
quantify and then monetize each consequence of each alternative regula-
tion. This would require Treasury to determine the number of taxpayers 
whose behavior would potentially be affected by the regulation. This would 
not include taxpayers for whom health care coverage was expected to easi-
ly fall below the 8% affordability threshold whether or not wellness incen-
tives are included (presumably higher income taxpayers), nor taxpayers 
whose coverage would not be affordable regardless of whether marginal 
incentives were included (presumably more low-income taxpayers or tax-
payers with especially high employer health care costs). From the remain-
ing universe of potentially affected taxpayers, Treasury would then 
estimate the number who might have an available wellness incentive, 
smoking-cessation incentive, or both; and then the number who were actu-
ally smokers. This would provide an idea of the universes of taxpayers who 
(a) could be affected in any way by how wellness-program incentives are 
included in the affordability calculation and (b) might have a smoking-
cessation benefit available, but who might not actually receive available 
smoking-cessation incentives and thus would be affected by a rule that 
treated the benefit as earned. 
The analysis would then turn to quantifying the behavioral effects of 
the alternative rules—would one rule actually encourage greater participa-
tion in smoking-cessation programs, and what would be the anticipated 
effects of such participation? What would be the compliance costs of alter-
native rules, and how would compliance costs affect behavior? What alter-
native antismoking intervention might Treasury carry out in connection 
with administering the individual mandate, and would that be more effec-
tive (in terms of costs and/or behavior)? 
Policymakers have devoted significant attention to quantifying behav-
ioral responses and trade-offs applicable in other areas of regulatory poli-
cy.214 But this quantification is lacking with tax policy: tax scholars and 
economists working on optimal income taxation are grappling with these 
 
214.  See OIRA PRIMER, supra note 6, at 9 (suggesting that existing “revealed preference studies” 
are a useful source of information for quantifying the trade-offs involved in regulatory alternatives). 
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issues,215 and the behavioral trade-offs in response to tax rules remain sub-
ject to significant academic debates.216 
Indeed, tax rules present particularly vexing analytical challenges for 
economists.217 Raising revenue generally distorts behavior in undesired 
ways, and greater taxation generally results in exponentially greater distor-
tionary costs, causing changes in behavior that “move the market away 
from the competitive equilibrium, thereby reducing social efficiency.”218 
The relevant point of analysis for modeling behavioral responses is the tax-
payers’ marginal tax rates, which vary widely.219 Among individuals, mar-
ginal rates vary based on family status, location (e.g., state and local 
income tax), type of income, and so on. For the corporate income tax, the 
basic distortions are of returns to labor (i.e., employee compensation), capi-
tal (i.e., investor returns), or in prices.220 Among business entities, marginal 
rates vary across lines of business, types of business investments, and loca-
tion of investments, among other factors.221 
Problematically, these responses are not well understood in the real 
world.222 Prior work on designing tax instruments has required making sig-
nificant assumptions about these key questions of behavioral responses.223 
To take one example, scholars continue to rely on a study from 1985 that 
found between $0.17 and $0.56 of deadweight loss for each marginal dollar 
of revenue raised.224 The study concluded that “a public project must pro-
 
215.  See JOEL SLEMROD & CHRISTIAN GILLITZER, TAX SYSTEMS 182–83 (2014) (summarizing 
the empirical challenges involved in measuring behavioral effects of different tax instruments, and 
evaluating behavioral responses along multiple margins, e.g., work/leisure, avoidance, evasion, career 
choice, and so on); Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 523, 528–35 (2013) (summarizing some recent progress in empirical work on behavioral respons-
es to taxation and emphasizing the need for more of this research). 
216.  SLEMROD & GILLITZER, supra note 215, at 79. 
217.  Raskolnikov, supra note 215, at 526, 533–37 (detailing the particular challenges that tax 
law raises for economic analysis, describing “immense complexity, uncertainty, and value dependence” 
in theoretical tax models, and emphasizing, under the header “Why What’s Good for Environmental 
Law Isn’t Good for Tax,” the challenge of inherent inefficiency in (most) taxation and the further com-
plication of responses, including substitution, evasion, and avoidance). 
218.  JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 589 (4th ed. 2013). 
219.  See id. at 608–11. And, actually, the best, although even more challenging, data point is 
probably each individual’s perceived marginal tax rate. 
220.  Id. at 715–16. 
221.  SLEMROD & GILLITZER, supra note 215, at 182. 
222.  See Raskolnikov, supra note 215, at 533–37, 540–46. 
223.  See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable 
Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 27 n.16 (2006) (arguing that tax incentives should be designed as-
suming “underlying price elasticities and behavior do not vary systematically across the income distri-
bution” in the absence of evidence to the contrary). 
224.  Charles L. Ballard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs 
of Taxes in the United States, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 128, 128 (1985). See Joseph Bankman & Thomas 
Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1905, 1925 n.85 (1987); Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size of 
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duce marginal benefits of more than $1.17 per dollar of cost if it is to be 
welfare improving.”225 But this is an enormous range, and the study relied 
on significant assumptions that ought to be tested before moving to the real 
world. This is just one example, but it is a key piece of information for tax 
policy analysis—the uncertainty and lack of data would impair effective 
cost–benefit analysis. 
Thus, the size and even the direction of some tax-induced distortions 
remains unclear, and even if empirical work provides greater insights on 
taxpayer elasticities, the analysis remains complex and dynamic.226 Poli-
cymakers have developed various methods for addressing some of these 
issues for purposes of revenue estimates.227 But revenue-estimate models 
are far less complex than models that attempt to integrate efficiency costs: 
revenue estimates involve determining the extent to which taxpayers will 
engage in the taxed behavior; whether those who are not taxed are able to 
do so through illegal evasion or legal avoidance does not matter to revenue 
estimators, nor does the cost of evasion or avoidance activities. But to es-
timate the social costs more broadly for purposes of cost–benefit analysis 
and to model behavioral responses accurately, much more information 
about the types of responses and costs of responses is necessary. 
Cost–benefit analysis thus offers alluring possibilities for integrating 
the social costs and benefits of tax policy changes into the regulatory pro-
cess: as a proven analytical method, cost–benefit analysis could provide 
insights on private allocative effects of tax regulations. But cost–benefit 
analysis is not plug-and-play, so realizing benefits from cost–benefit analy-
sis will in many instances further empirical research to quantify and mone-
tize how tax policies affect behavior. This research may have been started 
in other contexts and can build on the tools used for revenue estimates, but 
this leaves significant work to be done before cost–benefit analysis can 
play a reliable role in developing tax regulations. 
 
Government, 46 J.L. & ECON. 293, 317 n.56, 329 n.86 (2003); Brian Galle, Carrots, Sticks, and Sali-
ence, 67 TAX L. REV. 53, 72 n.102 (2013); Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: 
When Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2482 
(2014) (describing the Ballard et al. study as “[t]he most-cited economics article estimating the efficien-
cy costs of taxation”). 
225.  Ballard et al., supra note 224, at 128. 
226.  SLEMROD & GILLITZER, supra note 215, at 88–91. 
227.  The Department of the Treasury, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and various thinktanks 
have developed microsimulation models based on actual tax returns that capture behavioral responses at 
least as to tax return positions. See, e.g., The Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model, URBAN 
INSTITUTE, https://www.urban.org/research/data-methods/data-analysis/quantitative-data-analysis/micro 
simulation/tax-policy-center-microsimulation-model (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
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2. Distributional Analysis 
OMB has generally neglected distributional consequences of regula-
tions,228 but scholars have been skeptical of this blind spot in regulatory 
analysis: OIRA is seen as “disclaim[ing] any responsibility for developing 
protocols that agencies could use to determine the distributional impacts of 
a particular regulation,” which “sends a clear message that consideration of 
distributional consequences is a peripheral concern at best. Regulatory 
agencies have gotten that message and, in general, pay little attention to 
distribution.”229 OIRA seems especially keen on ignoring distributional 
effects of taxes in that it directs agencies to disregard transfer payments in 
analysis of the effects of regulations.230 
Still, some scholars have argued that distributional analysis has an im-
portant role to play in the regulatory process even outside of tax.231 Other 
scholars argue that distributional analysis is unfeasible.232 Steve Croley’s 
volume defending the administrative state and regulatory processes as gen-
erally up to the task of producing “socially beneficial regulation” is instruc-
tive on the challenges involved in confronting distributional issues.233 He 
notes that from “purely a distributive point of view, reallocation of social 
resources may be desirable even if a regulatory initiative’s benefits are 
outweighed by its cost.”234 The desirability of alternative distributional out-
comes, he argues, hinges on establishing a desired distribution against 
which the expected distributional outcomes of competing policy alterna-
tives can be measured.235 But even if policymakers could agree on the base-
line for the argument, there are measurement problems: how can you 
determine what distribution is desirable and whether it has been 
achieved?236 In other policymaking contexts aside from tax, disregarding 
distribution is justified by the belief that it is appropriate to rely on the tax 
 
228.  See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
229.  Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 1326. 
230.  See OIRA PRIMER, supra note 6, at 8 (explaining that OIRA’s guidance to agencies in-
cludes a stylized example of a Pigouvian tax, specifying that “taxes paid . . . by [a] firm to the govern-
ment are a transfer and have no effect on the net benefits of the regulation”); supra note 196 and 
accompanying text. 
231.  E.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 1324–29. 
232.  See id. at 1325 n.391, 1326–27; David A. Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost–
Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Design, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 154–58 
(2015). 
233.  STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD 
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 254 (2008). 
234.  Id. 
235.  Id. (describing the need for a “normative distributive baseline”). 
236.  See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1380 (2014) 
(explaining that Executive Order 13,563 recognizes that some benefits and burdens are “difficult or 
impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts”). 
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system to deal with redistribution—most notably, Louis Kaplow and Ste-
ven Shavell advocate that policymakers could avoid dealing with the dis-
tributive effects of nontax policies because any such effects should be 
corrected through the income tax.237 But that justification does not work for 
tax-policy analysis and the distributional function of tax regulations.238 
Because distributional effects are so central to tax policy, it is desirable 
to consider those effects in regulatory tax policy. If we were to treat the tax 
system as the tool for redistribution, it is all the more important that analy-
sis of tax regulations includes consideration of distributional effects. There 
is already institutional competence and capacity for such analysis in the 
Executive Branch (and also in the Legislative Branch). Distributional anal-
ysis of the tax system and of changes and proposed changes to the tax code 
are produced by the Service’s Statistics of Income division,239 Treasury’s 
Office of Tax Analysis,240 the Joint Committee on Taxation,241 and the 
Congressional Budget Office.242 Each organization uses microsimulation 
models based on previously filed tax returns (provided each year by the 
Service), and each carries out distributional analysis slightly differently 
(there are ongoing debates about which of several alternative approaches to 
key issues are preferable). The results are similar: distribution is analyzed 
by reference to some measure of pretax income, dividing individual tax-
payers into income-band ranges (e.g., less than $10,000, $10,000–$20,000, 
 
237.  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income 
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 994 n.64 (2001) (“[T]here may be no need separately 
to identify the redistributive effects of legal rules, especially of particular rules, because general data on 
the distribution of income and measures of the standard of living will tend to capture the aggregate of 
distributive effects from all sources.”). 
238.  See Richard Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2018).  
239.  See SOI Tax Stats - Individual Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, INTER-
NAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-
adjusted-gross-income (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
240.  JULIE-ANNE CRONIN, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OTA 
PAPER 85, U.S. TREASURY DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY (1999), https://www.treasury 
.gov/resource-center/tax-analysis/Documents/WP-85.pdf; OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, TREASURY’S DISTRIBUTION METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS (2015), https://www.treas 
ury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Summary-of-Treasurys-Distribution-Analys 
is.pdf. 
241.  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN 
MEASURING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS (J. Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter JCT 
METHODOLOGY], https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4471. The same micro-
simulation models that are used—by the government and thinktanks—for revenue estimates can pro-
duce distributional estimates, setting aside social costs. See supra note 227. 
242.  E.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 115TH CONG., THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 
2014 (2018) [hereinafter DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME], https://www.cbo.gov/system/files 
?file=115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53597-distribution-household-income-2014.pdf. 
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and so on),243 or into equal-sized groups (e.g., deciles244 or quintiles245). 
This sort of analysis is useful—it reveals how income is spread across the 
population, how the tax burden is spread across the population, and how 
specific proposals alter that distribution. 
But there are significant limitations to this analysis currently. The 
standard distributional analysis does not involve more nuanced distinctions 
based on characteristics other than income (for example, race, gender, 
health status, or education level).246 For example, although the Service col-
lects data on industries from corporate taxpayers and partnership filers, it 
has not used previously this data for cross-sector distributional comparisons 
of individual taxpayers.247 
Distributional analysis of the pass-through rule might show that differ-
ent alternative formulations make the rule significantly more or less regres-
sive. Because Congress mandated that the deduction must phase out for 
certain types of businesses, the way that those businesses are defined can 
mean that many more (or fewer) high-income people will be able to make 
use of the deduction. This seems like a very important consideration in 
formulating the regulations. Similarly, distributional analysis of the smok-
ing-cessation rule might have revealed that the rule was either beneficial or 
harmful for low-income people—it is hard to know without attempting the 
analysis, but either way, the information would have been a relevant con-
sideration to balance against the potential benefits of discouraging smok-
ing. On the other hand, assessing the distributional effects of the smoking-
cessation rule primarily has to do with how the rule shapes private behav-
ior—does it make less people buy health insurance, or does it make more 
people actually take part in smoking-cessation programs? Answering this 
question seems beyond the existing competencies developed to analyze 
distributional effects of collecting revenue. 
For rules like the pass-through regulation, the existing models could 
potentially be useful, particularly if used along with other data that revealed 
 
243.  JCT METHODOLOGY, supra note 241, at 17. 
244.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DISTRIBUTION OF 
FAMILIES, CASH INCOME, AND FEDERAL TAXES UNDER 2019 CURRENT LAW (2018), https://www.trea 
sury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Distribution-of-Tax-Burd en-Current-Law-
2019.pdf. 
245.  E.g., DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME, supra note 242, at 19. 
246.  The IRS can append some additional background information to the tax return data that is 
used to analyze distribution, including age and “other demographic and economic data.” CRONIN, supra 
note 240, at 13. 
247.  See SOI Tax Stats - Corporation Data by Sector or Industry, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-corporation-data-by-sector-or-industry (last visited Oct. 3, 
2018); SOI Tax Stats - Partnership Statistics by Sector or Industry, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-partnership-statistics-by-sector-or-industry (last visited Oct. 
3, 2018). 
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income characteristics of the affected population—although all of this begs 
further work by economists. 
C. Ossification vs. Interagency Deliberation 
A common concern regarding centralized review in general and cen-
tralized review of tax regulations specifically is ossification.248 There are 
several manifestations of ossification: when each proposed rule requires 
more time and energy, it leads to delays in commencing regulatory pro-
jects, delays in completing projects, failure to take up projects, failure to 
review and amend existing regulations, and in attempts to make up for 
these delays and failures, redirecting of agency resources to regulation-
writing instead of other priorities.249 This concern is a pointed one in the 
tax context, where there is a significant backlog of regulations to-be-
proposed250 and where there is wide recognition of the need for additional 
and faster guidance in order to facilitate tax compliance.251 
For economically significant regulations, the regulatory impact analysis 
prepared by the drafting agency is provided to OIRA and fed into an inter-
agency review process.252 This process allows experts from across different 
departments to weigh in on a proposed regulation and to help calibrate the 
regulation with the President’s priorities based on their close understand-
ings of technical issues. Cass Sunstein, the recent former head of OIRA, 
portrayed OIRA as a “conveyer and a convener,” acting as the central hub 
in the interagency review process, its primary and most important func-
tion.253 Scholars have commended interagency review as a means of apply-
ing appropriate expertise to policy challenges, eliciting useful information 
from within the government, and coordinating agency functions that might 
otherwise coincide or conflict.254 Additionally, the interagency process al-
 
248.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Which Institution Should Determine Whether an Agency’s Explana-
tion of a Tax Decision is Adequate?: A Response to Steve Johnson, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 4–5 (2014). 
A common reaction from tax practitioners and policy analysts to the prospect of OMB review of tax 
regulations has been concern about delays (ossification). See, e.g., Naomi Jagoda, Conservatives Push 
for New Check on IRS Rules, THE HILL (Mar. 6, 2018, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/regulation/finance/ 
376852-conservatives-push-for-new-check-on-irs-rules (quoting one tax practitioner asking, “Why 
would you slow the process down?”). 
249.  Pierce, supra note 248, at 4–5. 
250.  See generally DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2017–2018 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN (2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2017-2018_pgp_initial.pdf (listing, before the enactment of the 2017 
Tax Act, dozens of incomplete and unstarted regulatory projects). 
251.  Coder, supra note 178, at 868–69, 872. 
252.  See supra notes 80–86 (describing the interagency review process). 
253.  Sunstein, supra note 35, at 1841. 
254.  Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1131, 1184 (2012). Freeman and Rossi’s assessment is that the President (and by extension 
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lows an Administration to coordinate policies across departments and 
agencies.255 
Despite these sorts of potential benefits, could centralized review on its 
own nonetheless cause unacceptable ossification, particularly if producing 
quantified cost–benefit analysis of tax regulations is challenging? This is 
not simply a question of slow versus fast—there are potential benefits flow-
ing from the slower process. Ryan Bubb has credited the “creative tension” 
between staff and OIRA for producing “more and better information and 
analysis for regulatory decisionmaking.”256 Would a similar dynamic 
emerge in tax policymaking? And what is there to do in the short- to medi-
um-term when we expect that data will continue to be lacking? 
For example, the interagency process could have been enormously val-
uable for the smoking-cessation regulation. OIRA would have circulated 
the proposed regulation and accompanying analysis to other relevant agen-
cies, including perhaps HHS, the Department of Labor, and the Food and 
Drug Administration. Each might weigh in with suggestions on the rule or 
refinements on the analysis. Most obviously, experts in these other agen-
cies have greater experience and familiarity than Treasury with empirical 
studies on antismoking interventions. Invoking empirical work could have 
informed quantitative cost–benefit analysis of the proposed rule, allowing 
Treasury to use its own expertise in estimating costs of compliance in com-
parison with the anticipated benefits of the rule (if any), including the po-
tentiality that the rule would have unexpected effects, such as reducing 
access to healthcare. In an ideal version of interagency review, the shared 
information might inform an alternative plan to realize some further bene-
fits in smoking-cessation programs with lower costs. 
One challenge is that OIRA has not traditionally had any tax expertise, 
and overseeing tax regulations would require hiring new staff or redirecting 
existing staff to take responsibility for tax.257 This concern has historic va-
lence as well—the 1983 memorandum was motivated in part by a desire on 
the part of OIRA personnel to avoid being overwhelmed by tax regulations, 
with which no one was particularly interested in dealing.258 In such a small 
 
OIRA) is “uniquely positioned and motivated to manage the problems of shared regulatory space and 
that coordination tools afford him the chance to put his stamp on policy.” Id. at 1210. 
255.  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 31 (2010). 
256.  Bubb, supra note 37, at 51 (citing Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal Agency Bias 
and Regulatory Review, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 128 (2014)). 
257.  See GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 26 (“[Current OIRA staff] said that historically OMB 
had lacked staff expertise on tax policy.”). 
258.  This was relayed to this author orally by a former OIRA official, and echoes the concerns of 
current staff as reported to the GAO, id., and as relayed to this author in informal conversations. See id. 
(“[H]istorically OMB had lacked staff expertise on tax policy.”). 
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office (OIRA has just fifty full-time staff members),259 the sheer volume of 
tax regulations presents a significant burden that would detract from over-
sight of regulations in other important policy areas. In contrast, the IRS 
Chief Counsel “supervises approximately 1,400 attorneys.”260 Recent news 
reports have indicated that, following the enactment of the 2017 Tax Act, 
OIRA has sought to hire tax experts,261 including hiring a leading tax and 
administrative law scholar as an advisor.262 
Tax regulations have generally been shielded from one of the primary 
culprits of ossification that arises in other contexts: Pre-enforcement judi-
cial review of proposed rules. Such review can make the regulatory process 
move very slowly, but—in accordance with the Tax Anti-Injunction Act263 
and the Declaratory Judgment Act264—pre-enforcement review of tax regu-
lations is off limits.265 Some scholars have pressed the argument that courts 
should accept that pre-enforcement review of tax regulations is permissible 
under the Tax Anti-Injunction Act.266 Others have suggested that judicial 
review and centralized review should be complementary.267 Under that 
analysis, increased OIRA review is justified, in part, because parties have 
less access to judicial review.268 Conveniently, this either/or approach 
would obviate some of the concerns regarding ossification: while tax rule-
 
259.  Frequently Asked Questions, OIRA, OFF. OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, OFF. OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
260.  Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 8, 2011, 9:56 
AM), https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/General-Counsel/Pages/irs.aspx.
 
261.  Cheryl Bolen & Allyson Versprille, OMB Hires Tax Experts as It Negotiates Rules Review 
With Treasury, BLOOMBERG DAILY TAX REPORT (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.bna.com/omb-hires-tax-
n57982090700/. 
262.  Prof. Hickman Named Special Advisor to OIRA, UNIV. OF MINN. LAW SCHOOL (Apr. 18, 
2018), https://www.law.umn.edu/news/2018-04-18-prof-hickman-named-special-adviser-oira. 
263.  26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (“[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the 
person against whom such tax was assessed.”). 
264.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (providing declaratory relief except expressly disallowing such 
relief “with respect to Federal taxes”). 
265.  See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Com-
pliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 
1181 (2008) (questioning limitations on pre-enforcement judicial review of tax regulations). A few 
recent cases have suggested that this protection may be weakening. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 
135 S. Ct. 1124, 1133 (2015) (addressing the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, which applies to 
state tax provisions, and interpreting the provision more narrowly than courts have interpreted the Tax 
Anti-Injunction Act). 
266.  See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Gerald Kerska, Restoring the Lost Anti-Injunction Act, 
103 VA. L. REV. 1683 (2017). 
267.  Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the Ab-
sence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1620–23, 1623 n.143 (2014) (proposing more 
lenient judicial review for rules that have been subjected to greater executive oversight, including 
through OIRA review and cost–benefit analysis, and less deference for rules that are not). 
268.  Id. at 1622–23. 
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making may be slowed down marginally by centralized review, it remains 
(for now) insulated from expansive pre-enforcement judicial review. 
IV. ASSESSING THE COMPETING CONSIDERATIONS 
This Part evaluates the competing normative considerations involved in 
imposing centralized review on tax regulations. The preceding discussion 
highlighted one challenge of analyzing tax regulations: as a group, tax reg-
ulations have multiple and widely varying purposes and effects, which cut 
across public finance and regulation of private behavior. This Part seeks to 
focus the analysis of whether and how tax regulations might benefit from 
centralized review by offering a taxonomy of three distinct functions of tax 
regulations, drawing on public finance scholarship. This Part then analyzes 
the advantages, disadvantages, and challenges of centralized review in light 
of these varying functions. 
A. Three Functions of Tax Regulations 
As the preceding discussion of the smoking-cessation rule and the pass-
through regulations revealed, tax regulations have varied purposes. To par-
ticularize the analysis of how centralized review of tax regulations might be 
undertaken, this Subpart distinguishes between three functions performed 
by tax regulations: (1) private allocation, (2) public allocation, and (3) im-
plementation. Each is described below. 
First, some tax regulations result in allocating private resources to dif-
ferent private uses through incentives, intentional and unintentional; this is 
the private-allocation function. Second, some elements of regulatory tax 
policy involve allocating private resources to public uses by collecting tax 
revenue; this is the public-allocation function. As discussed further below, 
the private- and public-allocation functions can each have distributional 
affects, as changing tax policy redistributes resources among different 
groups.269 These first two functions are an extension of the distinction 
 
269.  Tax regulations affect distribution when the regulations determine which taxpayers or 
which groups of taxpayers have what amount of the total resources in society, for example, by offering 
credits—or, most intuitively, refundable credits—to certain groups. Any time the government collects 
revenue, it has the potential to alter who gets how much of the total economic pie, depending on who 
pays the tax and who benefits from government expenditures. For context, the Gross Domestic Product 
was approximately $18.624 trillion in 2016. GDP (current US$), THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank .org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). The 
individual income base was approximately $10 trillion (i.e., individual gross income totaled $10 trillion; 
taxable income was approximately $7 trillion), and total federal tax collections were $3.3 trillion. JOHN 
A. KOSKINEN ET AL., 2016 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK: OCTOBER 1, 2015 TO 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2016, at 1 (2017); MICHAEL PARISI, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME 
BULLETIN: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, PRELIMINARY DATA, 2016 (2018). 
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drawn by the Musgraves between allocative fiscal policies and distribution-
al fiscal policies.270 As Shaviro summarizes, “[a]llocation affects the 
amount, use, and character of all assets in society, while distribution affects 
who has what.”271 Through this lens, tax revenue that is deployed on public 
goods—for example, police protection—serves an allocative function be-
cause policymakers are allocating funds that individuals would spend or 
save to an alternative use.272 
The final function is the implementing function. Some tax regulations 
implement allocative and distributional decisions made by Congress; 
Treasury is given very little policymaking discretion and simply follows 
directives to promulgate substantive rules prescribed by statute. The im-
plementing function is consistent with the category of so-called interpretive 
rules that are familiar in other agency rulemaking contexts.273 
These three functions of tax regulations are not mutually exclusive—
any given regulation might have elements of each. For example, many tax 
provisions are focused on public allocation in that they raise revenue for 
the government to spend (in ways that are different from how the funds 
would have been deployed if left in private hands). These same revenue-
raising regulations may also affect private allocation because imposing tax-
es will affect private behavior. And both the public-allocation function and 
the private-allocation function could have distributional effects, since the 
manner in which the funds are raised and in which the benefits of govern-
ment spending accrue alters the relative wealth or income of different 
groups of taxpayers. The purpose of this taxonomy is not to definitively 
categorize regulatory projects that have multiple purposes; rather the point 
in the remainder of this Subpart is to illuminate that there are different ana-
lytical frameworks and expectations appropriate for different elements of 
tax regulations. 
Recognizing the varied functions of tax regulations brings to the fore a 
key point of confusion regarding how best to develop and analyze tax regu-
lations: tax regulations that affect private behavior are, in that respect, very 
much like other types of regulatory activity currently overseen by OMB 
(albeit, with varying degrees of efficacy). At the same time, other tax regu-
lations present issues that OMB disregards in its regulatory oversight, re-
 
270.  See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 6–11 (5th ed. 1989). 
271.  Shaviro, supra note 198, at 188. 
272.  Id. 
273.  See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text; Hickman, supra note 92, at 1764–65 (ob-
serving that “the courts have had little opportunity to apply contemporary administrative law principles 
for distinguishing legislative from interpretative rules in the tax context”). 
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gardless of the source of the regulations: OMB has not concerned itself 
with distributional analysis or with analysis of transfer payments.274 
Consider again the pass-through rules and the smoking-cessation rules. 
A regulation applying to a pass-through entity that provides services that 
are built on the reputation and skill of its employees will call upon each of 
the three functions: private allocation, public allocation, and implementa-
tion. The differential tax rates that the provision will create—and the way 
that lines are drawn in regulations to distinguish “winners” who are permit-
ted to take the deduction from “losers” who are not—will also have public-
allocation effects and private-allocation effects.275 The deduction will affect 
the amount of revenue taken in by the government, which will affect gov-
ernment spending, and the lower tax rates in particular industries may 
move investment and work effort from one industry to another. Each of 
these functions will affect distribution, both between industries and within 
industries, with varying consequences (and varying degrees of regressivity) 
for different income levels in different industries. 
Further, while Congress has given Treasury significant policymaking 
discretion to decide who can benefit from the pass-through deduction, it 
has also established a core set of rules about how the deduction should op-
erate in some respects, which gives rise to the implementing function in the 
forthcoming regulations. For example, for certain industries, the deduction 
is limited for people with incomes above congressionally mandated income 
levels. These rules will require regulations to implement but nonetheless 
are largely predetermined. For example, the definition of “qualified proper-
ty”276 that Congress enacted leaves open some questions as to what proper-
ty might be included—relatively straightforward gap-filling which leaves 
Treasury without significant discretion.277 These regulations will be simply 
implementing—that is, the regulations will fit within—policy decisions 
Congress has already made. All three functions are present, but as dis-
 
274.  See supra Section III.B.2. 
275.  At the 37% top marginal tax rate—which applies to married joint filers making over 
$600,000 or single filers making over $500,000—the 20% deduction increases after-tax income by 
7.4%. The increase is lower in lower tax brackets, on account of lower marginal rates. For example, it is 
7% in the 35% bracket, which ranges from $400,000 to $600,000 for married joint filers in 2018. Scott 
Greenberg & Nicole Kaeding, Reforming the Pass-Through Deduction, TAX FOUNDATION 1, 7 (2018), 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180621095652/Tax-Foundation-FF593.pdf; see supra note 189 and 
accompanying text. 
276.  The new provision in section 199A incorporates a somewhat vague, though longstanding, 
definition from 26 U.S.C. § 167. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 199A(b)(6) (West Supp. 2018). 
277.  Critics of the legislative definition have pointed out that, based on the statutory language 
alone, there are some absurd possible inclusions in “qualified property.” Kamin et al., supra note 193, at 
18. But the confines of Treasury’s task here is essentially a technocratic task, and certainly Treasury 
will issue regulations to flesh out this definition. 
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cussed below, it would not be productive to undertake the same type of 
centralized review for each of these elements of the regulatory project. 
Along the same lines, the central purpose of the smoking-cessation 
regulations under the individual mandate provisions is a private-allocation 
function: the individual mandate generally promotes private spending on 
health coverage that meets specific requirements, thus diverting spending 
on other forms of consumption or on nonconforming health coverage. The 
smoking-cessation regulation addresses a particular type of health insur-
ance incentive that is directly focused on shaping private behavior—it de-
termines whether certain individuals are subject to a penalty (essentially an 
excise tax)278 for failure to maintain acceptable coverage. The excise tax 
serves a public-allocation function: it raises revenue that is used to fund 
general government operations. And the rule is tied to income level and 
may well affect lower income people more than others, which means there 
is potential for a distributional effect as well. However, there is not a clear 
implementing function in this rule: the Executive Branch was essentially 
working from a clean slate because there was no indication that Congress 
directly contemplated the rule. 
Other tax regulations might implicate different combinations of func-
tions. Often, tax regulations consist of only the implementing function—
Congress provides a clear directive, and the task for regulation writers is 
simply to implement the scheme without adopting or altering policy.279 
Regulations that affect private allocation and no other function also arise 
occasionally: the Service carries out, via regulation, various excise taxes 
 
278.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 567 (2012). 
279.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6045, 6112 (2012); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-10, 301.6708-1 (2016); 
Treas. Reg. § 1. 6045A-1 (as amended in 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1 (as amended in 2017). Prior to 
Treasury drafting Treas. Reg. 301.6708-1, Congress enacted a tax provision requiring that any “material 
advisor” on certain types of transactions must maintain a list of clients who undertook such transactions 
along with “such other information as the Secretary may by regulations require.” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6112(a)(2). The provision further requires that such advisors make the list available to the Secretary 
within twenty business days of a request and imposes a penalty of $10,000 per day for each day beyond 
twenty that such a list is not produced. Id. There is an exception if such delay is for reasonable cause. 
Id. The Service issued the Regulation, which explains how the twenty days will be calculated and pro-
vides examples of real-life scenarios that might constitute reasonable cause. Treas. Reg. § 301.6708-1. 
Prior to Treasury drafting Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1, Congress enacted new Code section 6045, which 
requires securities brokers to track their customers’ basis in securities and to report the basis to the 
Service (and to the customer) when a security is disposed of on behalf of a client. 26 U.S.C. § 6405. 
The statute defines the key terms and provides a detailed rule as to when the reporting requirement 
attaches. Id. The regulation elaborates on the definitions provided in the statute and other details, and 
provides for some exemptions from the requirement in situations where reporting makes no sense (e.g., 
for sellers who are not subject to U.S. tax). Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1. The particulars of the Regulation do 
not involve any policymaking discretion, but nonetheless, these are important to help taxpayers under-
stand how to comply with Congress’s requirements. 
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that raise zero (or essentially zero) revenue.280 Thus, these regulations act to 
regulate private behavior but have no public-allocation or other function. It 
is also possible, at least theoretically, that a regulation could implicate only 
the public-allocation function (raising revenue, but not affecting private 
behavior). 
B. Recommendations 
The Trump Administration has committed to conduct centralized re-
view of some tax regulations,281 but the criteria for determining what regu-
lations will be subject to review remain largely undeveloped.282 Further, it 
is unclear how or if Treasury plans to carry out quantified regulatory im-
pact analysis as part of this centralized review. The Trump Administration 
framework calls for beginning to impose the most comprehensive version 
of centralized review by April 2019, providing Treasury and OMB some 
time to sort through these challenges. This Subpart proposes several guide-
lines for centralized review of tax regulations, identifies some specific chal-
lenges arising from the Trump Administration’s approach, and suggests 
options to improve centralized review of tax regulations over time. The 
three functions identified above can be useful to that end—each warrants 
somewhat different considerations in the drafting process and thus for cen-
tralized review. 
1. Private Allocation: Standard Centralized Review 
Centralized review is appropriate and would often be beneficial in the 
development of the private-allocation function of tax regulations, although 
OMB’s existing practices must be modified in some respects to work most 
effectively for tax regulations. Specifically, requiring quantified analysis of 
the private-allocation function is feasible, data permitting (this challenge is 
discussed below), but expectations must be moderated according to what 
insights on tax policy decisions the cost–benefit-analysis framework can 
 
280.  For an example, see Treas. Reg. §§ 56.4911-0 to 56.4911-10 (2018), which provides for a 
tax on “excess” lobbying expenditures made by 501(c)(3) organizations that make an election under 
section 501(h) (to be subject to a specific set of lobby expenditure limits). In 2014, just thirty organiza-
tions were subject to the tax, paying a total of $254,000. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 1: EXCISE 
TAXES REPORTED BY CHARITIES, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, AND SPLIT-INTEREST TRUSTS ON FORM 
4720, CALENDAR YEAR 2014 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14pf00et.xls. But the rule that the 
tax enforces—limiting expenditures—is one that significantly affects and shapes actions of public 
charities. See Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Legislative Speech: Aligning Policy, Law, and Reality, 62 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 757, 778–79 (2012). 
281.  The Trump Administration framework, like Executive Order 12,866, applies to regulatory 
actions generally, not only regulations. See supra notes 47–48. 
282.  See supra Section II.B.3. 
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produce. Relatedly, OMB should consider directing Treasury to make use 
of an alternative, simplified analytical framework to cost–benefit analysis: 
cost–effectiveness analysis. 
Adding interagency review to the process for developing tax regula-
tions with a private-allocation function offers significant promise, as tax 
regulations often touch on areas outside of Treasury’s and the Services’s 
expertise. For example, subjecting the pass-through rules to scrutiny from 
the Department of Commerce and the Small Business Administration could 
indeed be expected to produce better rules. This is especially promising 
given that, in the past, many tax regulations have been subject to little scru-
tiny (even though the proposed rules may go through the notice-and-
comment process)—that is, tax regulations are often produced without pub-
licly interested input.283 
There are also significant potential benefits to subjecting the private-
allocation function of tax regulations to cost–benefit analysis, although this 
raises some methodological issues.284 The methods and conventions for 
analysis that are currently suggested by OIRA285 can inform Treasury as to 
the potential behavioral response aspects of a tax regulation (consider the 
smoking-cessation rule). But at the same time, in the current centralized 
review process, cost–benefit analysis is used to attempt to maximize social 
benefits, with the expectation that a regulatory project will only go forward 
if the benefits exceed the costs. When the private-allocation function of tax 
regulations is mixed with the public-allocation function or the distribution 
function, however, the resulting rule often will not yield social benefits 
overall. This is because the primary benefits of the rule are not accounted 
for in cost–benefit analysis.286 Rather, the inputs will be costs—compliance 
costs, administration costs, and gain or loss from behavioral changes. In 
some cases, where behavioral changes produce positive externalities, cost–
benefit analysis could include benefits and could be considered, but even 
then it is likely that benefits will be overwhelmed by costs in many cases. 
The simplest solution to this is to use the cost-benefit-analysis toolset to 
produce cost–effectiveness analysis of tax rules that cannot produce net 
 
283.  See Wallace, supra note 17, at 219 (tallying participants in the notice and comment process 
for tax regulations and finding almost no commenters for most proposed regulations). 
284.  Whereas the interagency review process really requires a convener like OIRA, quantified 
analysis of regulatory proposals could be decoupled from the question of who should require, oversee, 
or do both with the analysis. That is, Treasury could self-impose cost–benefit analysis requirements on 
certain regulations without OMB oversight, or Congress could require it and shape it in some way other 
than what OIRA prescribes. I set aside the alternative possibilities for now. 
285.  See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text. 
286.  See Raskolnikov, supra note 215, at 533–34. The question of how to account for the bene-
fits of raising revenue requires further consideration, and will be especially important if cost–benefit 
analysis becomes a regular feature of the tax regulatory process. 
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benefits, with the goal of minimizing the costs of achieving specific policy 
goals, rather than maximizing benefits.287 
One limitation to the feasibility of cost–benefit analysis or cost–
effectiveness analysis is that quantifying and monetizing private-allocation 
effects may involve quantification that is not feasible based on currently 
available data. Treasury and OIRA should survey existing research and 
data to identify—and publicize—areas of need. Ideally, Treasury would 
support research in these areas. Even if financial support is not feasible, a 
public assessment of needs may help prompt researchers to pursue specific 
types of information, and Treasury might facilitate this by seeking to make 
tax data available to researchers whose proposals can provide useful inputs 
for quantified regulatory impact analysis. 
One significant potential downside to centralized review of the private-
allocation function is that welcoming a more complicated and more politi-
cized tax regulatory process will create more footholds for well-organized 
interest groups to get what they want and will delay rules that need to be 
publicized quickly. It is reasonable to question whether this will create ad-
ditional problems, but there is no reason to think that this concern should 
be any more pronounced than it is with other types of regulation where, of 
course, centralized review is mandated. Nonetheless, OIRA and Treasury 
should commit to transparency regarding participants in the various deci-
sion-making processes and at the numerous decision points created by the 
prospect of centralized review (e.g., Does a project appear on the regulato-
ry agenda? Is a regulation subject to review? Should Treasury conduct a 
regulatory impact analysis? Should OIRA intervene on any of these 
points?). 
2. Public Allocation: Revenue Estimates and Distributional Analysis 
Centralized review could be beneficial but also should take on a differ-
ent form as applied to tax rules that have a public-allocation function. 
Quantified analysis can improve transparency for the public-allocation 
function of tax regulations, but this quantified analysis should consist not 
of extensive cost–benefit or cost–effectiveness analysis, but rather of OMB 
requiring revenue estimates, similar to the current practice with non-tax 
transfers.288 Treasury is well-equipped to provide this analysis, and in fact, 
in some instances it makes such revenue estimates internally (i.e., Treasury 
produces revenue estimates that are not released to the public but that in-
 
287.  See Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53 DUKE L.J. 
1067, 1068–69, 1076 (2003). 
288.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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form policymaking, both legislative proposals and regulatory policy). 
Mandating revenue estimates as part of the centralized review process 
would ensure that tax regulations conform to congressional design and that 
revenue cannot be disregarded at the whim of the executive branch, at least 
not without public disclosure. Deeper qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of the public-allocation function requires grappling with the very challeng-
ing philosophical question of how to account for government spending as a 
cost or benefit. But revenue estimates are a useful and currently available 
point of analysis. 
Further, where feasible, analysis of public-allocation regulations should 
include distributional analysis. Treasury and the Service have the capacity 
to produce some distributional analysis, which means that tax regulations 
could be an area where OIRA could begin to fulfill the long-neglected 
mandate to consider distributional effects of regulatory policy. OMB 
should mandate that Treasury provide distributional analysis of tax regula-
tions that trigger review, using the same methods and producing the same 
basic outputs (for now) that Treasury and the Service have honed for legis-
lative tax proposals.289 Even this somewhat limited analysis could help in-
form regulatory tax policy and create transparency as to the effects of 
different tax regulations on particular groups of taxpayers. OMB should 
consider Treasury’s and the Service’s analytical methods, which could be a 
model for distributional analysis of other types of regulations. Further, 
Treasury and the Service should consider whether and how to refine distri-
butional analysis to account for private-allocation effects and to make more 
fine-grained distinctions between different groups of taxpayers. 
Perversely, transparency could be a detriment for the public-allocation 
function in some respects: why would any president want to “own” tax in-
creases carried out through regulations?290 Indeed, it seems possible that 
revenue estimates could become a poison pill that prevents proposed tax 
regulations from moving forward. Despite this potential political downside, 
the normative benefits of well-analyzed proposed tax policies and well-
informed regulation drafting remains appealing, especially when the tools 
already exist to make effective revenue estimates. The procedures already 
exist to subject those revenue estimates to interagency scrutiny, which 
could help improve the substance of proposed regulations. Thus, central-
ized review for provisions that raise revenue—the public-allocation func-
tion—can be beneficial, although the methods of analysis can be honed 
beyond simple revenue estimates. 
 
289.  See supra notes 228–31 and accompanying text. 
290.  Of course, President Obama did do this with the earnings stripping regulation. See supra 
Section II.B.2. 
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Many tax regulations will have a private-allocation function along with 
the public-allocation function, because raising revenue will have some be-
havioral effects and will have differential effects on after-tax income across 
different groups. Taken together, requiring revenue estimates and distribu-
tional analysis where there is a public-allocation function, and imposing 
some form of cost–benefit analysis or cost–effectiveness analysis only 
where there is a private-allocation function, would result in significant 
quantified analysis of many tax regulations. Although the interagency re-
view process may shed little light on the public-allocation aspect of tax 
regulations specifically,291 it will be beneficial for the private-allocation 
function. OIRA can plan accordingly: where the public-allocation function 
features prominently, the onus will be on Treasury to prepare revenue esti-
mates and distributional analysis before submitting the rule to OIRA for 
review. On the other hand, where private-allocation effects seem signifi-
cant, OIRA and Treasury should plan for a robust interagency review pro-
cess and should start to practice and refine versions of cost–benefit or cost–
effectiveness analysis. 
Recognizing those challenges and limitations, requiring Treasury to 
undertake some version of cost–benefit analysis and revenue estimates will 
allow the private- and public-allocation functions to help illuminate the 
effects and degree of significance of tax regulations. Moreover, introducing 
OMB’s interagency review process to the formulation of regulations has 
great potential to improve tax regulations in substance and to allow for sal-
utary coordination of tax regulations in promoting the Administration’s 
priorities. The result could be a more responsive rulemaking apparatus, a 
better-informed public (and thus less opportunity for capture behind closed 
doors), as well as improved transparency.292 
3. Implementing: No Centralized Review 
Finally, as in other contexts, centralized review of interpretive regula-
tions—the implementing function—serves little substantive purpose. Thus, 
the current practice of abstaining from centralized review is, indeed, justi-
fied on normative grounds for a broad swath of tax regulations that are 
highly prescribed by Congress.293 Although Treasury and the IRS have, 
until recently, drawn too large a circle around the implementing function 
 
291.  See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
292.  Again, the extent to which this political-accountability benefit—attributing decisions of the 
bureaucracy to the President—is meaningful in the real world is subject to debate. 
293.  See Wallace, supra note 17, at 193–69, 194 n.71. 
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(i.e., claiming that almost all tax regulations are exempt from Executive 
Order 12,866 because they are interpretive), using it to effectuate a blanket 
exemption from centralized review, this history should not give rise to an 
overcorrection. Many tax regulations have very large effects on revenue 
and thus might trigger centralized review as economically significant based 
on the transfer amount alone, if not treated as exempt from such review 
(and if revenue effect is made to be relevant to trigger centralized review, a 
departure from the Trump Administration framework). But often these reg-
ulations are carrying out precise directives from Congress that involve little 
if any policymaking discretion at the regulation-writing stage.294 The extent 
to which these sorts of narrow delegations continue to predominate is an 
open question—it depends on whether Congress’s quick policy develop-
ment and legislative drafting, as seen with the 2017 Tax Act, proves to be 
an aberration or the new normal. 
4. The Threshold for Review 
Regardless of the substantive contents of any tax regulation, centralized 
review should be structured to avoid counterproductive politicization.295 
This means that the categories of tax regulations subject to review should 
be clearly prescribed in advance by objective criteria. The alternative, 
which would be accomplished by the Trump Administration framework if 
no further criteria are specified, leaves the decision of whether or not OMB 
will impose centralized review to the discretion of the OIRA Administrator 
or lower-ranking OIRA personnel, and this approach creates the potential 
for lobbying efforts from interested parties (who might, depending on the 
circumstances, prefer or oppose centralized review) to be decisive. The 
Trump Administration framework presents the prospect of a significant 
lack of transparency as to which rules are subject to review and which are 
not. The OIRA Administrator should further specify substantive triggers 
for review. 
The general idea of setting a threshold for more searching centralized 
review—embodied in OIRA’s current standard of making “economically 
significant” regulations, which are those that have an annual economic im-
pact of $100 million or more—makes as much sense with the private-
 
294.  See infra Section IV.B.4 (discussing the challenge of setting a baseline for determining the 
revenue effect of a regulation and how the approach of assuming no legislation and attributing all costs 
and benefits of the legislation and regulation to the regulation would result in centralized review of 
many implementing regulations). 
295.  See supra Subpart III.A (contrasting two types of politicization: political influence that 
directs public policy to achieve private goals for a limited subset of affected parties and political ac-
countability that flows from transparent decision-making by democratically accountable actors). 
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allocation function of tax regulations as for nontax regulations.296 However, 
the Trump Administration’s decision to exclude transfer payment amounts 
(i.e., to disregard the question of how much tax revenue is at stake) from 
the trigger is ill-conceived. It may make review of tax regulations more 
arbitrary because tiny costs imposed on a huge number of people—which is 
often an effect of tax regulations—may frequently trigger review. 
Further it will create unnecessary complications for centralized review 
of tax regulations, particularly in the immediate future. Applying the eco-
nomically-significant trigger to tax regulations means that the full review 
process will only come to bear on a small portion of proposed tax regula-
tions. But determining which regulations are subject to such review re-
quires quantifying the costs of many regulations. Especially given that the 
data and methods for evaluating costs imposed remain under develop-
ment,297 this standard will create murkiness as to what tax regulations 
should be subject to review. 
One readily available alternative is to look only at the revenue effect. If 
a tax regulation will alter revenue collection by $100 million (plus or mi-
nus, and since that threshold is arbitrary, it could be adjusted), that alone 
could trigger centralized review. A revenue-based standard could make use 
of existing competencies—Treasury has revenue estimating models and 
procedures—and would provide the same sort of filter that the $100 million 
threshold seeks to accomplish for nontax regulations. A revenue-based 
threshold could also help with the baseline problem: Treasury and OIRA 
could decide that the threshold is in comparison to (1) a baseline starting 
with the legislation as enacted but assuming only limited compliance; or (2) 
a baseline that starts with the legislation as enacted and assumes compli-
ance to the extent predicted in revenue estimates at the time of enactment 
(note: the revenue estimates make some assumptions about how the Service 
will implement and enforce).298 These alternatives deserve further consid-
eration; either of these two could potentially work and would allow for 
consistent imposition of centralized review. In theory, the same set of alter-
natives is available for a threshold based on behavioral and compliance 
costs, but the calculation of those costs will be less consistent, particularly 
 
296.  This is not to endorse or disclaim the “economically significant” standard. See Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. §§ 641–42 (1993). There is an ongoing debate about the wisdom of that 
standard, and I see no reason to exclude tax regulations with a private-allocation function from that 
broader discussion. See generally Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency 
Avoidance of OIRA, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2014). 
297.  See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text. 
298.  A third alternative is assuming a baseline of no legislation and thus no compliance, whereby 
the comparison attributes all of the costs and benefits of policy changes caused by the underlying statute 
to the regulation. This would result in all implementing regulations being subject to review if the under-
lying statute has a significant revenue effect, which does not seem productive. 
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in the early going, as Treasury works to identify and generate data inputs 
and refines its regulatory-impact-analysis practices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The procedures and practices that shape tax regulations are particularly 
relevant now as both the Obama and Trump Administrations have taken 
extraordinary steps to change federal tax policy unilaterally through admin-
istrative actions, and the Trump Administration has promised to impose 
some form of centralized review on tax regulations in the near future. Rec-
ognizing the strengths and weaknesses of centralized review as applied to 
tax policy—and particularly as applied to different sorts of regulatory tax 
policy described in the three-part taxonomy developed here—will help to 
establish consistent and productive oversight of the tax regulatory process, 
which furthers political accountability and can foster effective regulatory 
tax policies. 
 
